Less is known for certain regarding the Soviet government than the other two nations in the Grand Alliance. Much of the information given out was propaganda or lies, and the secrecy and deceptiveness of Stalin's regime made his personality and policies incomprehensible to foreign officials. Their records have also been far less available to historians than those in other countries.

Many politicians put on various guises, but few are as contradictory as Stalin's were. He has been described as "pathologically cruel," and it is debatable that mental illness played a role in his actions. Even Lenin, who had brought Stalin into the Communist Party's Central Committee, said in 1922 that as General Secretary, Stalin would not be capable of controlling the use of his power. His nickname was "Koba" for "the Fearless." In his younger days he repeatedly escaped from prison, was banished, and lived a furtive, rebellious lifestyle, most likely contributing to his secretiveness, persistance, and independence. Stalinist diplomacy revolved around ranks, espionage, and total control. Averell Harriman observed of Stalin that he was "better informed than Roosevelt, more realistic than Churchill, and in some ways the most effective of the war leaders."

The following expresses two somewhat over-simplified ways of interpreting the policy of the Soviet government. The first is that it followed Marxian principles, which dictated that Russia must be retained as the homeland of Socialism, and that they must work for a worldwide revolution of the proletariat. From this it can be assumed that all relationships with non-Communist states involve hostility, whether concealed or obvious, and that all alliances are temporary and superficial. The second interpretation is that Soviet policy was guided by Realpolitik, or the quest for power, which explains the government's many changes and twists during any time of insecurity.

The Russian government had no deadline for achieving the Socialist ideal of a classless, free society, and so they could continue to use this goal to justify their movements for further power. Creating a secret police, amassing a vast army, and carrying out purges did not seem to greatly sway the belief of the people in their leader; he was a revered father-figure to them. Stalin acknowledges in one of his speeches the great importance of the unwavering strength shown by his people, despite the mistakes made by high level officials.

Two main components of the USSR were its Bolshevik Party, which stood to perfect the coming revolution, and the Red Army, in place to protect the Russian nation. The latter was not entirely controlled by Communists. Each had a bureaucracy of its own, but they were eventually both brought under the control of Stalin. He first obtained the title of Secretary General of the Bolshevik Party, then just before the war he became Premier of the Soviet Government, and he subsequently became Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army and Marshal of the Soviet Union. There is some question as to whether he was in some way ruled by the Politiboro, but it is more likely that he just used them for advice, after eliminating all those opposed to him. He did however use the Politiboro as an excuse during negotiations with the Allies as to why he "couldn't" do something that he in fact just did not want to do.

In the government, Stalin really did have sole authority, and talking to anyone else was useless. But although all those beneath him did not dare oppose any of his orders, this did not mean that they were carried out.

Composed of a rigid, unbroken chain of command, subordinates within the Soviet government felt such fear that they strove to outdo one another, ignoring the original orders, and often tried to hide things that went wrong. They also had no other job options, and thus couldn't afford to speak up. But the USSR nonetheless managed to achieve great changes in their society and economy, giving the government the power to gear all the nation's strength towards one goal. They altered the nature of international relations by expanding the role of the government, and they blurred the line between war and peace. They took war to be the normal state of things, and so suffering heavy losses was expected. This caused a huge difference in outlook between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies.

By November of 1941, Soviet production was half of what it had been five months before. But Stalin's refusal to concede that defeat was possible kept national morale up. He also transported his factories further east to keep them running and out of German hands. His Marxist thinking led him to believe for some time in the revolt of the German people against Hitler, but he eventually gave this up and ceased to distinguish between the people and their leader.

Elana Kimbrell - World Politics - Fall 2001

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