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I: INTRODUCTION
Much of the analysis of the 1994 Rwanda genocide has been in reviewing
the 100-day period in which the killing of close to 1 million Tutsi, and
Tutsi-sympathizers took place. Many media sources viewed the genocide
as a purely ethnic conflict, one that is particular to the make up of
an African nation. Although it may be easier to comprehend the atrocity
by looking at the specific period of time in which the genocide took place,
it is necessary to review Rwanda's complex history. Many of the dynamics
that contributed to the genocide had been developing since the pre-colonial
era.
Toward the end of the pre-colonial era, and more predominantly during
the time of colonization, ethnic identities for the Rwandan population
were being constructed. The divisions and imbalance of power created between
the Hutu and Tutsi populations left a lasting effect on the political
climate of the country. Through the age of decolonization, a movement
towards democratization was also present. These occasions resulted in
tensions and civil war, and the problematic Arusha Peace Accords that
followed. The start of the genocide forced an end to a ceasefire that
had been called into effect within the country.
Throughout the 1994 massacre, most all of the international community,
particularly the United States, remained inactive. Although there were
many opportunities in which any number of international actors could have
chosen to intervene, no one did. As a result of the genocide, there was
a humanitarian crisis in which millions of Rwandan fled their cities to
have become refugees and internally displaced people. To address those
that organized, facilitated and participated in the genocide, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has been created
to restore justice to the country of Rwanda. -top-
II: PRE-COLONIZATION
As early as 2000 BC, the first people that inhabited Rwanda were hunter-gatherers
and forest-dwellers who were descendants of the Twa group, the smallest
ethnic group in modern-day Rwanda.[1] Around 1000 AD the Hutu, who were
a group of farmers, began to move into the country and displace them.[2]
The Tutsi were part of a pastoralist migration that settled in Rwanda
between the 11th and 15th century.[3] The movement of the Tutsi onto land
that was originally farmed by the Hutu was fairly non-confrontational.
During the pre-colonial period, the terms "Tutsi", "Hutu"
and "Twa" "corresponded to occupational categories. Cattle-herders,
soldiers, and administrators were mostly Tutsi, while Hutu were farmers.
Twa were marginalized and often mistreated by the others. Hutu and Tutsi
were less sharply distinct, and individuals could and did move between
the categories as their fortunes rose and fell".[4] As a desire grew
to develop a more formalized state, the calcification of identity groups
increased. During this time, the military helped in formalizing these
groups and increasing the divide between them. Although clear definitions
had not yet been made, the military was divided so that the Tutsi held
the most powerful positions, followed by the Hutu, and lastly the Twa.[5]
Colonial powers were the largest influence on the formulation of rigid
definitions of ethnicity. Within this context, Hutu became defined as
inferior while Tutsi were considered to be superior. -top-
III: COLONIAL RULE
The experience of colonial rule began in Rwanda with the German occupation
in 1897. This was monumentally important not only for Rwanda, but for
the system of colonialism as well. The German presence in Rwanda innaugurated
the soon to be widely utilized policy of indirect rule.[6] Its effect
was globally long lasting and left a significant mark of Rwandan politics.
Specifically, as author Gerard Prunier points out, it "acted in direct
continuation of pre-colonial transformation towards more centralization,
annexation of the Hutu principalities and an increase in Tutsi chiefly
power"[7]. Although its effects were carried over, the German administration
lasted only until 1916.
The Belgians followed the Germans in their occupation of Rwanda and had
begun implementing most of their policies by 1926. The greatest effect
that they had in Rwanda was the consolidation of power and control into
the hands of the Tutsi minority. By the end of the Belgian presence in
Rwanda in 1959, close to 100 percent of all chief and sub- chief positions
were held by Tutsi.[8] Furthermore, the use of identification cards was
implemented so that the Belgians were able to identify the Rwandan citizens
at all times.[9] Another effect that the presence of the Belgians had
upon Rwanda was the increased presence and importance of the church. Between
1927 and 1932, it had become the main social institution of Rwanda.[10]
As the influence of the church grew, it began to monopolize the education
system. Since Tutsi controlled most of the leadership positions, the distribution
of education quickly became uneven. As the literacy of the Tutsi rose,
those of the Hutu remained stagnant.[11] During these years, ethnic identities
were solidified and Hutu and Tutsi became increasingly polarized. The
Hutu continued to be socially, politically and economically marginalized
by the western parties as well as by their Tutsi neighbors. -top-
IV: DECOLONIZATION/DEMOCRATIZATION
In 1959, in response to years of political and social marginalization,
the Hutu population participated in a political uprising. As a result
of this turmoil, tens of thousands of Tutsi fled into exile in neighboring
countries.[12] In 1962, elections were held in which the Hutu majority,
represented as the political party MDR-PARMEHUTU (The Movement Democratique
Rwandais/Parti du Mouvement et se l'Emancipations Hutu), won by receiving
77.7% of the vote.[13] In July of the same year, Rwanda officially became
independent under a republican president, Gregoire Kayibanda. The following
year Tutsi refugees, who were exiled at the onset of the Hutu revolution,
attacked. During this action close to one thousand of the so-called Inyenzi
were killed.[14] In 1973, a coup d'etat was seized in which Juvenal Habyarimana
took power and established the MRND (Mouvement Revelotionnaire National
pour le Developpement). From this, Rwanda functioned under a single-party
political system in which Habyarimana was elected as president in 1978,
1983 and 1988.[15] As talks were held to address the refugee problem that
had been created from the outpour of Rwandan Tutsi, talks were held in
Washington DC and the RPF (Rwandese Patriotic Front) was formed.[16]
In October 1990, the newly formed RPF invaded from Uganda. From this invasion,
the incursion of a civil war began. Through numerous attempts to initiate
a cease-fire, fighting continued in Rwanda for years to come. In response
to voiced national and international concerns, Habyarimana claimed the
initiation of progress toward a multi-party political system and the abolishment
of identity cards; he never acted upon either of these declarations.[17]
Up until the start of the Arusha Peace Accords, the MRND was growing stronger
through the support of Hutu militia. -top-
V: THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS
The Arusha Peace talks began in Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania
with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defense
of Rwanda as well as with the Organization
for African Unity (OAU).[18] The Belgian government, as well as the
American and French governments were also involved in these peace talks.
The negotiations lasted about 13 months and their agenda ranged from the
subject of a cease-fire to principles of law, power sharing, the integration
of armies and the repatriation of refugees.
The first talks of the peace processes convened on July 12, 1992 and were
broken down into 6 rounds of discussion.[19] The first set of talks focused
on creating a joint military commission at the OAU to insure a continuation
of the cease-fire that had been called into action on July 31.[20] The
second phase began on August 17, 1992 and consisted of an announcement
of the protocol on the rules of law in regards to the peace process as
well as the composition of a transitional government to help with that
process.[21] From September 7-18, the third convention took place in which
agreements on power sharing, unification and political cooperation were
initiated.[22] It was in the fourth session that the delegates reached
an agreement as to the nature of the transitional government; it was to
be called the "Broad-Based Transitional Government" (BBTG) and
would be in power for 22 months before being followed by free elections.[23]
The details of this government were worked out on November 25, 1992, when
the fifth exchange occurred.[24] In the final round of negotiations, the
focus of the talks was refugees and security. In regards to security,
the decision was made to construct a neutral military force, to condense
all of the nation's armed forces into a single national army and to formulate
an army command structure.[25]
Throughout the peace processes, President Habyarimana continuously refused
to sign onto the accords that addressed the concepts of power sharing
and the creation of a transitional government.[26] In June 1993, the RPF
were included into the protocol for the creation of joint armed forces.
It was not until August 1993 that the Rwandan government and the RPF signed
the Arusha accords, and set into effect a new call for cease-fire.[27]
It was the start of the 1994 genocide that ended this long-standing cease-fire.
-top-
VI: THE GENOCIDE (APRIL-JULY 1994)
On April 6, 1994 President Juvenal Habyarimana, the former president
of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntariyaman, the former president of Burundi,
were killed in a plane crash as they were returned from talks in which
they were reaffirming the Arusha Accords. Many people believe that the
genocide began almost immediately after President Habyarimana's plane
was gunned down. In the capital of Kigali, roadblocks were set up and
"within hours, a systematic manhunt was underway for "enemies"
of the regime"[28]. Within a few days, the death toll had mounted
to close to 50,000 and some estimate that the total number of deaths reached
1 million. The first people killed in the genocide were the opposition
Prime Minister, the president of the constitutional court, priests, leaders
of the Liberal Party ad Social Democratic Party, the Informational Minister,
and the negotiator of the Arusha Accords.[29] The massacre was systemic
and planned with the intention of gaining both recognition and political
power for the MRND, FAR, and other administrative and military forces.
Most all of the genocidaire were Hutu, and assembled to create the Interhamwe
("those who attack together"), and Impuzamugambi ("those
with a single purpose") militias, as well as the Rwandan Armed Forces
(FAR).[30] They were armed with simple weaponry: AK-47 assault rifles,
grenades and machetes. Their goal was to exterminate all Tutsi, and Tutsi-sympathizers,
including Hutu who were married to Tutsi and those Hutu who would not
take part in the killing. There was an understanding by the militia that
their actions would not only gain them political control but would also
help revive the country from their economic destitute.
The genocidaire were assisted by Rwanda's internal media. The country's
radio stations and newspapers were used to disseminate information and
ethnic hate propaganda that helped the coordinate the violence and killing
that were the genocide. On July 4, 1994, the RPF took control of the capital
of Kigali. Soon after, they call into power the interim government of
Pastor Bizimunga as President and Faustin Twagiramunga as Prime Minister.[31]
-top-
VII: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
In October 1993, the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was created in an attempt
to assist in peacekeeping missions during the civil war. On January 11,
1994 Romeo Dallaire, the force commander of UNAMIR sent a memo to the
United Nations Office of Peacekeeping Operations warning them of "the
existence of arms caches, a plot to assassinate Belgian UN peacekeepers
and Rwanda members of parliament, and the existence of a list of Tutsi
to be killed"[32]. The predictions made in his memo came true immediately
after the start of the genocide when the militia killed Prime Minister
Agathe Uwilingiyiman and the 10 Belgian UN peacekeeping soldiers that
guarded her.[33] In response, the UN reduced its UNAMIR peacekeeping force
from 2,500 to 270 people. The removal of those UN troops was the earliest
sign of the relationship that the international community would have with
the genocide.
The French remained involved in the peacekeeping mission through the Senegalese
and their humanitarian action of Operation Turquoise, which went into
effect on July 23, 1994.[34] They set up a "humanitarian safe zone"
in which 12-15,000 Tutsi refugees escaped. Besides the goal of providing
refuge for the Tutsi, the safe zone was an attempt to restrict the RPF
from taking over the capital of Kigali.[35] Although the invasion of the
RPF gave hope of an end to the genocide, the French were concerned that
the mission of the RPF would not coincide with that of France.
The United States chose to act on their own behalf rather than on the
behalf on the country of Rwanda. The Clinton Administration was made shy
after having lost 18 US soldiers to the peacekeeping mission in Mogadishu,
Somalia in 1993. In the case of Rwanda, the administration airlifted all
American citizens out of Rwanda, and proceeded to withhold their troops
and remain inactive for the duration of the genocide. The administration
was particularly careful in avoiding use of the term "genocide"
when discussing the brutal massacre that was occurring in Rwanda. Their
reasoning behind this was to avoid the responsibility of having to investigate
the claims of genocide. On May 3, 1994 President Clinton signed the Policy
Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) [36] representing their desire to remain
conservative and withdrawn in their peacekeeping activities. "It
appeared to have been designed to thwart American participation in situations
just like Rwanda's, including such requirements that any U.N. mission
must be a response to threats to international peace and security, must
advance American interests at acceptable risk, and must have adequate
command and control procedures and an exit strategy."[37] Although
PDD 25 did not necessarily cause the US not to intervene, it game them
reasoning to withhold their troops. Human
Rights Watch reporter Alison Des Forges wrote that the international
community "focused on issues of immediate importance for their own
country: Belgium on extricating its peacekeepers with a minimum amount
of dishonor, the US on avoiding committing resources to a crisis remote
from US concerns; and France on protecting its client and its zone of
Francophone influence"[38]. -top-
VIII: HUMANITARIANISM & REFUGEES
The International community saw an unprecedented number of refugees
flee from Rwanda starting in the beginning of the genocide. The Hutu leaders
who planned and led the genocide "redirected their power to compel
their compatriots to retreat from Rwanda with them. In a matter of days
2 million Hutus - many of them virtual hostages - crossed the border into
Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi"[39]. In November 1994 the UN Secretary-General
reported that there were about 230 Rwandan political leaders in Zaire
controlling the refugee camps from within.[40] Inside of the camps the
militia leaders had gained control of the relief aid and were using it
as leverage, along with intimidation and military force, to remain in
power over the refugee population. The goal of the leaders was to not
let the refugees return to Rwanda. When the NGOs made attempts to remove
the individuals that were influencing the camps, and had participated
in the genocide, from the humanitarian area, close to 5000 of the militia
held the aid workers hostage.[41] Soon after the attack, 15 NGOs threatened
to withdraw from the refugee camps.
One of the internal battles of humanitarianism was played out in Rwanda.
Aid agencies were confronted with the dilemma of humanitarian ethnics
vs. medical duty and moral responsibility vs. the Hippocratic oath.[42]
Many aid agencies removed themselves from Rwanda, behind the reasoning
that the aid was being pilfered by the genocidaire, and that the camps
were unsafe environments for the refugees and aid workers. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Doctors
Wothout Borders and Caritas
[42] remained in Rwanda for the full extent of the needed humanitarian
assistance. In the end, "the demans of 'neutrality' overrode those
of fighting against genoicde"[43] -top-
X: CONCLUSION
Much of the analysis of the 1994 Rwanda genocide has been in reviewing
the 100-day period in which the killing of close to 1 million Tutsi, and
Tutsi-sympathizers took place. Many media sources viewed the genocide
as a purely ethnic conflict, one that is particular to the make up of
an African nation. Although it may be easier to comprehend the atrocity
by looking at the specific period of time in which the genocide took place,
it is necessary to review Rwanda's complex history. Many of the dynamics
that contributed to the genocide had been developing since the pre-colonial
era.
Toward the end of the pre-colonial era, and more predominantly during
the time of colonization, ethnic identities for the Rwandan population
were being constructed. The divisions and imbalance of power created between
the Hutu and Tutsi populations left a lasting effect on the political
climate of the country. Through the age of decolonization, a movement
towards democratization was also present. These occasions resulted in
tensions and civil war, and the problematic Arusha Peace Accords that
followed. The start of the genocide forced an end to a ceasefire that
had been called into effect within the country.
Throughout the 1994 massacre, most all of the international community,
particularly the United States, remained inactive. Although there were
many opportunities in which any number of international actors could have
chosen to intervene, no one did. As a result of the genocide, there was
a humanitarian crisis in which millions of Rwandan fled their cities to
have become refugees and internally displaced people. To address those
that organized, facilitated and participated in the genocide, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has been created to restore justice
to the country of Rwanda. -top-
ENDNOTES:
1.
Sellström, Tor et al. "The International Response to Conflict
and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience (Study 1: Historical
Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors)" Journal of Humanitarian
Assistance (March 1996).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid
5. Ibid.
6, Prunier, Gerard. The Rwanda Crisis; History of a Genocide. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1995. (25)
7. Ibid .
8. Ibid 27
9.
Appendix 2; Chronology. Journal of humanitarian Assistance.
10. Prunier 32
11. Ibid 33
12. Appendix
2
13. Mamdani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killers; Colonialism, Nativism,
and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
(125)
14. Appendix
2
15. Ibid
16. Ibid
17. Ibid
18. Jones, Bruce. "The Arusha Peace Process".
The Path of a Genocide; The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. Eds. Howard
Adelman & Astri Auhrke. New Brunswick: Transaction, 1999. (132)
19. Ibid 137
20. Ibid
21. Ibid 138
22. Ibid
23. Ibid
24. Ibid 139
25. Ibid
26.Appendix
2
27. Jones
28. Newbury, David. "Understanding Genocide."
African Studies Review 41 (1998): 73-97.
29.
Ferroggiaro William, ed. "The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994
(a National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book). Aug 20, 2001.
30. Mamdani 204
31. Appendix
2
32.
Ferroggiaro
33. Appendix
2
34. Klinghofer, Arthur Jay. The International Dimension of Genocide in
Rwanda. New York: NYU Press, 1998. (57)
35. Ibid
36. Ausink, John A. "Watershed in Rwanda: The Evolution of President
Clinton's Humanitarian Intervention Policy". Pew Case Studies in
International Affairs. Washington DC: 1997. (4)
37. Physicians
for Human Rights: Burkhalter, Holly. "The 1994 Rwandan Genocide and
U.S. Policy".
38. "Leave None
to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda". March 1999: 171-1
39. Medecins Sans Frontieres, ed. World in Crisis; The Politics of Survival
at the End of the 20th Century. London: Routledge, 1997. (160)
40. Martin, Ian. "Hard Choices After Genocide: Human Rights and Political
Failures in Rwanda". Hard choices; Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian
Intervention. Ed. Jonathan Moore. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.
160
41. Ibid
42. de Waal, Alex. Famine Crimes; Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry
in Africa. Oxford: James Curry, 1997.(193)
43. Ibid 195
-top-
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OVERVIEW:
I: INTRODUCTION
II: PRE-COLONIZATION
III: COLONIAL RULE
IV: DECOLONIZATION/
DEMOCRATIZATION
V: THE ARUSHA PROCESS
VI: THE GENOCIDE
(APRIL
- JULY 1994)
VII: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
VIII: HUMANITARIANISM &
REFUGEES
VIX: CONCLUSION

Belgian Colonizers
Video still
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance
Chronology
of Rwandan history
The
US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994
A National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book
William Ferroggiaro, Editor
August 20, 2001

"The moral dilemmas that have
followed the international community's failure to prevent or check genoicde
in Rwanda in 1994 has divided humanitarian organizations, human rights
critics, and the staff of the United Nation's refugee agency themselves"
-- IAN MARTIN
(HARD CHOICES: MORAL DILEMMAS IN THE RWANDA GENOICDE)



"The hour had struck for the
most ardent champtions of Hutu Power - fo those whose political zeal knew
no limits- to call the nation to arms against those who they considered
to have betrayed them"
MAHMOOD MAMDANI
WHEN VICITMS BECOME
KILLERS
203

International Tribunal for Rwanda

"No one can say with certainty
how many Tutsi were killed between March and July of 1994 in Rwanda. In
the fateful one hundred days that followed the downing of the presidentail
plane - and the coup d'etat therafter - a section of the army and civilian
leadership organized the Hutu majority to kill all Tutsi, even babies"
-MAHMOOD MAMDANI
WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS
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