The Middle East is a region divided
by multiple conflicts. In order to recognize the principal causes of
these hostilities, it is important to understand the nature of states in
the Arab world. Writing with concern for the legitimacy of these states,
Michael C. Hudson observed that:
The legitimacy problem in the Arab world is
basically the same as that in most newly independent, rapidly modernizing
states. In essence, it results from the lack of what Dankwart Rustow has
designated as the three prerequisites for political modernity: authority,
identity, and equality. The legitimate order requires a distinct sense of
corporate selfhood: the people within a territory must feel a sense of
political community which does not conflict with other subnational or
supranational communal identifications.1
Contemporary Arab states, therefore, are struggling to establish
legitimacy based on the three principles established by Dankwart
Rustow. Primarily, this legitimacy crisis concerns the issue of
identity. As Hudson later states:
The fact that the Arab world in the late 1970s
is divided into eighteen sovereign jurisdictions plus the Palestinian
community enormously complicates the problem of developing two of the
prerequisites of legitimacy--national identity and authority. National
identity in the Arab umma is at best multidimensional, at worst
mired in irreconcilable contradictions.2
The establishment of arbitrary borders following British and French
colonialsim in the Middle East is not the only feature hampering endeavors
of national identity. In order to explain why Arab states have difficulty
in formulating a comprehensive identity, an understanding of the Arab
definition of nationalism iteself, what it means to the Arabs and what
they consider to be unifying elements, is essential. Following a detailed
description of Arab nationalism, identification of its principal faults
exposes the dilemma of minorities, such as Kurds and Maronite Christians,
living whithin Arab states and excluded from this rhetoric of nationalism
as defined by the Arabs. Modifying the ideology of Arab nationalism to
acknowledge or include these groups, however, is certainly
possible. Ultimately, the legitimacy of modern Arab states depends upon
the ability of the Arab community to establish a national identity that
incorporates all local populations.
Defining the Nation
In their search for a comprehensive identity, the Arabs embraced the
German conception of nationalism. Sati' Al-Husri initially identified
four types of nationalism: religious ideology relies on a common belief
system to define the nation, Marxist nationalism attributes nation
formation to modernization and capitalism, the French idea promotes the
assumption that nation formation is the result of choice, and the German
ideology "perceives of the nation in terms of the cultural nation, and the
national language as the skeleton of national culture."3
Al-Husri specifically rejected the French theory of nationalism
established by Ernest Renan in 1882 that "nationhood resided in the
collective will of the people to live together as a community."4 Rather, he believed that "To
equate the nation, as Renan did, with an electoral process of daily
plebiscites, was to degrade nationalism to a low form of politics and
electioneering."5 Instead,
Al-Husri argued that "the strongest and most effective tie is the national
tie, which derives from a common language and history."6:
The German thinkers supported the theory that
the nation is a living organism which has developed organically through
common language and history, which--like all living organisms--is
determined by subjective impulses.7
This contention is markedly different from that proposed by Renan, that
the nation is a conscious decision. The Germans, in contrast, argued that
the nation is a predetermined entity whose transformation cannot be
conducted deliberately. This claim, therefore, affected Al-Husri and
other Arab nationalist theorists significantly. Nationalism would not be
defined by state boundaries but by intrinsic commonalities. The challenge
remained, therefore, of distinguishing what features united Arabs in a
single nation.
For this objective, the Arabs specifically rejected race as a unifying
feature of the Arab nation. Al-Husri, for example, dismissed the concept
of race, described as "any common origin of a social group united into a
people," as a myth that could assist national cohesion but would not
accurately describe the true Arab nation, which developed from a diversity
of populations which distinctly separate origins.8 Furthermore:
Theories of racial purity were scoffed at and
branded as fanciful concoctions, with no scientific basis or rational
validity. Neither the French nor the Arabs were descendants of one single
identifiable stock. All nations were formed out of an admixture of races,
resembling a great flowing river which is being constantly fed by the
waters of various tributaries and sources. To isolate a particular
droplet or stream, and claim it to be a representative sample, is to fly
in the face of common sense and scientific evidence.9
Therefore, race not only inaccurately described the Arabs,but also was so
illogical that it would have destroyed the credibility of the idea of an
Arab nation itself. Moreover, many theorists saw the racial approach as
deriving from the independent motives of its creators. To illustrate,
Shaykh 'Abdullah al-'Alayili believed the German concept of a superior
race was"a mere emotional reaction to the decline of religion, on the
one hand, and a desire for power and domination on the other."10 Michael 'Aflaq likewise
concluded that "divisions based on racial assumptions, such as the one
between Berbers and Arabs in the Maghreb, weremanufactured by western
imperialism," doubtless for the purpose of conquest.11 Race, therefore, was an
unproven notion seen to have functions other than to unite a people. Such
a perception, therefore, could not be included as a unifying quality of
Arab nationalism.
Rather than ethno-nationalism, then, the Arabs relied on social
nationalism to describe their condition. Al-'Alayili outlined these two
types and concluded that social nationalism "grew out of feudalism in
which social organization revolved around a stretch of territory," yet
ethno-nationalism, "which is properly speaking a species of
subnationalism, grew out of tribal amalgamations and in which ethnicity
took primacy over social factors."12 The difference therefore, is
that social nationalism recognizes the importance of a shared space while
ethno-nationalism recognizes the importance of mutual and encompassing
familial relations. Al-'Alayili suggested that the goal of social
nationalism should be to establish the "proper balance between the
individual, on the one hand, and the community, or society, on the
other."13 Identifying the
common bonds between these two entities would significantly encourage this
balance.
The scholars, therefore, reached relative consensus that Arabic and Islam
are two of the principal unifying factors of Arab nationalism. Arabic was
notable because communication performs a vital role in uniting a
population, through speech and through the written word, including
literature.14 Moreover,
language in general--concepts,
references,style--carries a load of tacit meanings, nuances, and
subtle keys to common values and experiences which differentiate
assimiliated from nonassimilated strangers.15
Al-Husri acknowledged thesignificance oflanguage while formulating his
theory of Arab nationalism. He observed that language was
The most important non-material link between
the individual and the other members of a social group, because it is the
instrument of communication... of thought... and not least, of the
heritage of ideas and cultureal achievements.16
Therefore, al-Husri recognized a connection between communication and the
perpetuation of aculture or a nation. In fact, he declared that language
virtually defined nations, which were "principally distinguished from each
other by the fact that they speak different languages, and the separate
existence of each one of them is based on this, their own
language."17 Thus,
Al-'Alayili pronounced that the land of the Arabs
coincided with the historical and final
expansion of the Arabic language. This was a natural development
resulting from successive Arab conquests, migrations and settlement. The
final triumph of Arabic followed the law of natural selection whereby
other languages, spoken by various ethnic communities, were gradually
wiped out and the Arabization process left behind a permanent imprint and
a triumphant language.18
Yet the philosophers did not limit themselves to a scientific discussion
of the relation between language and the nation. Rather, they built upon
these basic assumptions and applied Arab pride to these
contentions. Language was particularly important tot eh Arabs, as Edward
Atiyah argued, because although Westerners might be convinced by the
reason and rhetoric of an argument, Arabs were persuaded by the beauty and
style of the oration.19
Thus Qustantine Zurayq argued that
It is the duty of the nationally conscious
[Arab] [sic] to ponder his language in order to know its genesis and how
it spread and to comprehend its superior qualities over other languages
and the special endowments which enablled it to achieve complete mastery
over these vast reasons.20
Certainly the expectation was that pride of language would generate pride
for the nation. Furthermore, Zaki Al-Arsuzi stressed the mystical
qualities of Arabic compared to other languages, such as Latin. Arabic,
he argued,
is essentially in conformity with nature
itself. It is an intuitive language whereby what it signifies is not
mediated by the concept which gives meaning to both signifier and
signified. Rather, the word and its meaning are both united in their
signification of a referent that is itself fully absorbed in this direct
operation.21
The admiration of the Arabs for their language led Hans E. Tutsch to
declare that "Language for the Arabs is not only a means of communication,
but an opiate for the people."22 Arabic is, without a doubt, a
principal factor in the theory of Arab nationalism.
The perfection of Arabic resulted from the success of Islam, the theorists
claim, and therefore, the religion itself must be a unifying factor of
Arab nationalism as well. Primarily, the language spread with the
religion, most importantly because the Qru'an, the scripture of the
Muslims, had been revealed in Arabic. Thus Arabic, rather than aramaic,
came to dominate the region. In fact, in some instances Arabic became
popular more rapidly than Islam.23 An evident interdependence
exists, therefore, between Arabic and Islam that is important for the
discussion of Arab nationalism. Even in the contemporary Arab world, the
standard Arabic is viewed as originating from the dawn of Islam.24 The Arabs, therefore, hesitate
to alter their language in any manner that they believe would corrupt the
pure language of the Qur'an.25
Islam as it relates to nationalism, however, is not a religious attitude
but a historical and cultural heritage. Particularly in the mind of the
Christian Michael 'Aflaq, Islam and Arab nationalism were
inseparable.
For in Europe, religion was imported from the
outside and thus remained 'alien to its nature and history,' whereas for
the Arabs Islam formed part of their innermost personality.26
The Arabs and Islam, therefore, share a common territory and historical
legacy. Qustantine Zurayq, another Christian Arab, initiated this premise
when he recognized the significance of the influential Arab
prophet, Muhammed.27 That
Islam was initially revealed to the Arabs, who became "its earliest
arbiters and protectors," responsible for delivering the Message to all
mankind, and that the Arabs ultimately performed a substantial role in the
administration of the united Islamic state are valuable historical
heritages for Arabs of any faith.28 Most significant for the
promotion of Arab nationalism, moreover, Islam established the first union
of Arabs:
The first and foremost achievement of the
Islamic movement was the unification of the Arabs for the first time in
their history. Thus, in a historical setting, Arabism owes to Islam its
very existence.
Originally divided by tribal loyalties, Islam provided a common
brotherhood that persuaded the Arabs to become one nation.29 Christine M. Helms attributes
this unity to the communal nature of the five pillars of Islam. Most
importantly, the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca unites Muslims worldwide,
"essentially becoming the earthly embodiment of the spiritual Islamic
community."30 Michael
Hudson promotes a similar view:
The profound significance of Islam as a
component of Arab identity lies in its pervasiveness in society, its
integrating function beyond kinship, its adaptability, and its
sociopolitical values.31
This societal consiousness united all Muslims during Islam's first years
of practice and expansion. As Muslims themselves, therefore, many Arabs
were also united by this phenomenon. Thus the Arabs, regardless of their
faith, consider Islam as a secular unifying feature of Arab
nationalism.
These theories of Arab nationalism appear general and flexible enough to
encompass the entire Arab world. Indeed, as an ideology alone, the idea
of Arab nationalism might benefit the Arabs in the development of their
culture and the advancement of national causes, such as the Palestinian
issue.32 As a state
policy, however, Arab nationalism reveals its shortcomings. The Arab
world is not homogeneous, and a state ideology founded on the nationality
of only one group is destined to exclude the minorities living within the
borders. Thus the two fundamental features of Arab nationalism, Arabic
and Islam, have divided the states of Iraq and Lebanon, respectively. As
these two countries attempt to apply Arab nationalism in order to solve
the problem, the results prove that the application of Arab nationalism to
the state must be revised in order to reestablish order and strengthen
state legitimacy.
A Different Language: The Kurds of Iraq
The Kurds are not Arabs, and their national identity differs significantly
from that of the Arabs. This dissimilarity originates from the Kurds'
lengthy history of isolation, resulting from living in a virtually
unassailable mountainous region as well as subsisting in an autarkic
economy and establishing strong territorial connections. As a result, the
Kurds maintained relative autonomy regardless of changes in the imperial
rule surrounding them.33
In fact, Kurdish tribal influence might have reached from Eastern Europe
to the Persian Gulf around the 1st century B.C.E.34 Despite enjoying autonomy,
however,
the Kurds have never formed an independent
political entity; throughout their history they have been ruled by
outsiders, including the Armenians, the Persians, the Byzantines, and
later the Turks and Arabs.
The land of the Kurds constantly exchanged hands between empires. Most
importantly, the Persian and Ottoman empires partitioned the Kurdish
lands, transforming the area into a frequent battleground. This activity
prevented the Kurds from developing a unified, independent state. Yet the
Ottoman Empire still permitted the Kurds to rule themselves autonomously
until the 1800s when the Ottomans established direct rule over the Kurdish
lands.
This event had a strong influence on the development of Kurdish
nationalism. At this time, the Kurds were united (by a foreign
empire) for the first time, under a central administration, while around
them other groups established their own sense of nationality, most notably
the Arabs.35 In addition,
the Kurdish culture faced extinction via assimilation into Persian and
Arab culture because the Kurds did not view themselves as comprising a
distinct nationality. Like the Arabs, the Kurds were not a homogeneous
race.36 Moreover, most
Kurds practiced the same religion as the Arabs and Persians and would have
embraced the Arab idea of an Islamic legacy.
37 Having been educated in
written
languages such as Turkish and Arabic, moreover, many urban Kurds became
assimilated into Turkish and Arab culture.38 In order to rescue their
Kurdish heritage, therefore, the non-assimilated Kurds took an active
interest in their native language.39
Language became an important feature of identity for the Kurds because it
differed significantly from Arabic. Kurdish is a former Western Iranian
language derived from Indo-European languages, while Arabic has Semitic
origins.40 Moreover, the
Kurds have a proud, oral literary history that existed before
Islam.41 This heritage
separated the Kurds from the Arabic Islamic historical legacy. During
direct Ottoman rule, when the Kurds began to consolidate their national
ideology, they established a written language.42 This action established some
permanence for Kurdish language and prevented assimilation.
Yet lingual centrifugal forces divided the Kurds as well. For example,
the Kurds wrote using the script of the natives surrounding them, so that
they wrote their language in Arabic script around Iraq and Cyrillic script
near the Slavs.43
Furthermore, like the Arabs, the Kurds spoke many diverse dialects, but
differing from each other to the degree of difference between Romance
languages such as Italian and Portuguese.44 The Kurds speak a variety of
these dialects in modern Iraq.45 Despite these differences, the
Kurds considered themselves a "nation of internal diversity," which
distinguished them from a unitary minority that permits foreign
rule.46 Like the Arabs,
the Kurds recognized themselves to be different from the Ottomans and
desired independence.47
The development of Kurdish national sentiment demonstrated that Kurdistan
should have been a separate entity following the defeat of the Ottoman
Empire. Great Britain, however, aimed to exploit the oil reserves
discovered in the Kurdish district of Mosul. The British, therefore,
annexed a part of Kurdistan to the British mandate of Iraq in the
Sykes-Picot Agreement that divided the Ottoman Empire between Great
Britain and France in 1916.48 As a result, the Kurdish lands
were partitioned by the borders ofTurkey, Iraq, and Iran.49 The Kurds became a minority in
all
three of these countries. In Iraq, for example, they comprised about
seventy-five percent of the minority population, becoming the most
significant minority for the central government to placate.50 More importantly, the Kurds
consisted of 23% of the Iraqi population,allowing them the opportunity to
challenge the authority of the Iraqi government. Yet the dependence of
Iraq on the resources of the Kurdish district prevented the Iraqi
government from allowing the materialization of an independent
Kurdishtan.51 The fate of
the Kurds, therefore, depended on the decisions of Baghdad.
The situation of the Kurds in Iraq provides a useful opportunity for
studying the imperfections of Arab nationalism because the ruling party in
Iraq, until recently, has itself subscribed to the theories of
Arab nationalism. The government attempted, therefore, to apply these
theories in order to alleiate the Kurdish problem. Beginning with the
early nationalist theorists, very little had been stated regarding groups
that refused to integrate into Arab nationalism.When the Iraqi ruling
party, the Ba'ath, came to power in 1963, therefore, they had few
references for integrating the kurds into an Arab Iraq. Michael 'Aflaq
simplified the dilemma at the time and claimed that it "resulted from an
incorrect understanding of Arabism." Arabic nationalism, he explained,
was not limited or chauvinist but flexible and humanitarian. In addition,
'Aflaq blamed foreign imperialism for attempting to divide the Middle East
and claimed that "the Kurds lived side by side with the Arabs for hundreds
of years and fought courageously to defend the Arab lands." Therefore,
although the Kurds were a separate nation, they enjoyed a special bond
with the Arabs, and this bond was an integral part of Arab
nationalism. In addition, 'Aflaq declared that the Kurds had the same
objectives as the Arabs in their nationalist endeavors, and that only a
minority of Kurds were attempting to benefit from the situation by
attempting to destroy this historical bond.52 Two fundamental points emerged
from 'Aflaq's statements. Primarily, the Arabs respected the Kurdish
nationalist goals and understood their concern for the future of their
culture. Secondly, the Arabs and Kurds needed to unite, especially in
Iraq, against foreign forcesthat would benefit from a dispute between the
two groups.
These two points were irreconcilable with Kurdish nationalism. By
including Kurds in Arab national theory, although in an indirect way,
'Aflaq forced the Kurds into a relationship that they evidently did not
desire. Moreover, claiming to respect Kurdish goals projected the
appearance of a benevolent government, while in truth the Iraqis only
intended to recognize the Kurdish endeavor to preserve their culture, not
to self-government. By transforming these points into policy, therefore,
the Ba'ath were condemned to encounter resistance.
The application of these assertions inevitably became one of duality and
conceit. In 1958, before gaining power, the Ba'ath published a statement
assuring that "Kurds and Arabs are partners in Iraq." Yet the partnership
was certainly not bilateral. During the early 1960's for example the
Ba'ath hardly allowed the Kurds any voice in their affairs. Meanwhile the
Ba'ath pursued their own goals of pan-Arabism, without the consent of the
Iraqi Kurdish population, who had been declared their "partners" in
Iraq. The decision to include Iraq in any Arab federation or state should
have included the Kurds, who were naturally concerned regarding their fate
in a larger nation-state to whose nation they did not belong. The Kurds,
therefore, demanded that the Ba'ath grant them autonomy, but negotiations
on
the matter were unsuccessful.53
In 1968 the Ba'ath again rose to power and made sincere efforts to
reconcile with the Kurds. This compromise mostly consisted of recognizing
Kurdish culture and incorporating Kurds into the central
government.54 Later, on
March 11, 1970, the Ba'ath granted extensive concessions to the Kurds that
established self-government and ceded to other Kurdish demands while
dedicating the Iraqi government to helping in the development of the
Kurdish district.55 These
negotiations were largely the result of Iraqi fears that instability would
weaken the state and allow foreign infiltration, not of the development of
any new platform that recognized Kurdish rights to self-rule.56 In 1972, however, the situation
worsened again as the Ba'ath and Kurds disagreed regarding the
implementation of the 1970 agreement.57 The Kurds concluded that they
would have towin their independence by force.58 The fighting that ensued
resulted in a breakdown of the Kurdish movement and the success of the
Iraqi government.59 Later,
however, in 1976, Iraq again granted autonomy to the Kurds,60 but in 1988 unleashed what
appeared to have been an extermination project against them.61 Thus the duality
continued.
The policies that the Iraqi government adopted in relation to the Kurds
provoked A. Sherzad to state:
Iraq has been the scene of a confrontation
between two unequal, hierarchically structured entities: an Arab entity,
endowed with a state structure, and a semi-independent Kurdish entity,
lacking a state structure but possessing its own political sphere, albeit
in a minority capacity. As far as Baghdad's strategy is concerned, it has
aimed, and still aims to integrate the Kurdish entity within its own state
structure and ideology, thus destroying its autonomy, reducing the Kurdish
question to one of mere cultural recognition. This recognition could be
progressively eliminated through long-term strategies, such as the
intensification of campaigns aimed at promoting the arabization of the
Kurdish regions.62
This was inevitably the result of attempting to include Kurds, who already
possessed a nation of their own, in the Arab nationalism framework. By
honoring their own language and refusing to assimilate, the Kurds proved
to be dissidents in the eyes of the Ba'ath. When applied to a state
structure where significant minorities are present, therefore, the
theories of Arab nationalism predictably fail to generate a comprehensive
political culture.
Divisions of Faith: The Maronites of Lebanon
According to theories of Arab nationalism, Lebanon should not experience
the problems that it does. The majority of the Christians and Muslims in
this state are Arabs, speaking Arabic and sharing a similar
culture.63 Thus the
population already enjoys a shared heritage and language. Yet the
principal difference among them is, of course the diversity of their
religions. The most influential relgious group, the Maronites, are
seignificantly separated from the Muslims and indeed the rest of Lebanon
because of their religion. This difference has hindered Lebanon's
development of a cohesive national sentiment and produced antagonism
between its Muslims and Christians, especially the Maronites.
These antagonisms are mostly the result of historical opportunities. The
Maronite faith was founded in Syria by Maron, a monk who broke away from
teh Uniate Church of Syria and established a mystical order in the late
300s C.E. Later facing persecution from the church of Antioch, the
maronites escaped to modern-day Lebanon.64 They resided peacefully within
the Christian empires until the Muslims rescued the Maronites from
Byzantine rule three centuries later. Although not persecuted by the
Byzantines, the Maronites viewed themselves as Semites and welcomed the
opportunity to be joined with the Muslim Arabs as one entity. As
non-Muslim "People of the Book," or dhimmi, the Maronites were
granted some autonomy and allowed to live peacefully under Khalifate
rule.65 Later the Ottoman
Empire adopted the same practice, naming the system
millet. Although this system allowed the minority religions to
practice their separate faiths, it also established some undesirable
attitudes that perpetuate under the modern political culture of
Lebanon.66 To
illustrate:
The theocratic view was the basis of the
'millet-system,' which, while it allowed a certain autonomy to the
minorities, also increased the completeness of their separation from one
another and from the majority. This was particularly true of those
minorities of which a large proportion lived compactly in a single
area; they came to regard themselves, if they had not always regarded
themselves, as a 'peculiar people' linked by no moral or political tie
with their neighbors. To complete their isolation there was added the
memory of injustices, real or imagined, which they had suffered at the
hands of the majority.67
These injustices occured most forcefully during the Khalifate reigns of
Abd al-Malik and al-Mutawakkil. Al-Malik permitted Muslims to settle in
dhimmi lands and prohibited Christians from becoming civil
servants, and later al-Mutawakkil degraded Christians by forcing them to
show openly in demeaning ways that they practiced a different faith than
the Muslims. These actions greatly affected the Maronites by fostering
distrust for the dhimmi system and fear of a systematic
annihilation of their religion.68
When the Crusaders came in 1097, therefore, the Maronites welcomed these
new heroes and became their closest allies. This new friendship developed
into a profitable relationship between the Maronites and the West
following Maronite "conversion" to Roman Catholicism. Although the
Maronites maintained many of their original practices, the union with the
West has been an incredibly strong influence in the Maronites' perception
of themselves.69 For
example, the Maronites consider themselves to be French, not Arab, and
they therefore make great efforts to practice French culture, rejecting
their own heritage.70 This
sentiment resulted from a declaration made by the French king during the
Seventh Crusade that Maronites are citizens of France.71 At the same time, however,
these Crusaders persecuted the Muslim Arabs, producing Arab hatred of the
West.72 The enemies of the
Arabs, therefore, were the friends of the Maronites. The Maronite
estrangement of the Arabs became even more pronounced following the First
World War. At that time, as Great Britain and France divided the former
Ottoman Empire, the Arabs felt betrayed by the two European powers whom
they believed had come to liberate them. Having previously identified
with France, therefore, the Maronites did not feel the same outrage as the
Arabs and were, in fact, negatively associated with the new colonial power
by the Arabs.73 A clear
distinction between Maronites and Arabs came to exist.
As a result of these changes, the Maronites have developed a distinct
nationality. In fact, the Maronites explicitly do not desire any
association with the Arabs.74 They consider themselves
"Arabic-speaking," rather than a part of the Arab nation.75 Consequently, the Maronites
"conceptualize Lebanon as a country in but not of the Middle
East."76 Moreover, "it has
led them to regard Lebanon not primarily as the western frontier of the
Arab world but as the eastern frontier of Christendom."77 This religious association with
the West proved advantageous when modernization began to influence the
Middle East. Because Western technology dominated the globe,
modernization would benefit primarily those who spoke a Western language
and had a Western education. For the Maronites, these virtues came as a
result of their sharing a common religion with the Western
countries. While the Maronites increased their wealth, however, the Arabs
experienced a psychological conflict as they attempted to reconcile their
culture with their need for Western productions. Thus,
so much of Lebanon's success story before and
after World War II was a Christian triumph, one that ignited the innate
assumption of Christian superiority, encouraged by the West's own barely
hidden contempt for the Arab East.78
The Maronites, therefore, developed a sense of supremacy over other
Lebanese, especially the Muslims, whose religion they despise.79
Considering themselves to be superior, the Maronites believe that they
have a special mission in the Middle East to use their supremacy to
"perform their duty to Christendom."80 This duty takes many
forms; often it is to transmit Westernization to the Arab lands.81 The Maronites' perceived
mission originated from their conceptualization of Lebanon as a bridge
between two worlds: the Western European Christian lands and the
Arab-Islamic East.82
Lebanon, they argue, has its own historical legacy of autonomy. "Caliphs,
Crusading rulers and Ottoman Sultans alike refrained from demanding more
from Lebanon than tribute and the formal recognition of their
suzerainty." Consequently, the country became a haven for persecuted
minorities and religious groups who, in order to survive, did not trouble
each other. Thus Lebanon has acquired a history of tolerance that is
important to the Maronites' confidence in their importance.83
Because their self-proclaimed legacy is separate from the Arab legacy of
Islam, the Maronites cannot associate themselves with the Arabs. Rather,
they have chosen the ancient Phoenicians to be their honorary
ancestors. The Phoenicians correspond conveniently with the Maronite idea
of Lebanon as a cosmopolitan bridge between East and West. Moreover, this
independent identity further separates the Maronites from the Arabs and
raises their status: "It is because of its Mediterranean culture that the
Maronites claim Lebanon is above and apart from the Arabs who surround
it."84
The concepts above are among three influences motivating the
Maronites:
the Maronite's determination to separate
themselves from their cultural environment; their innate sense of
superiority in relation to the Muslims and other Lebanese Christians; and
their visceral fear as a Christian minority in the Muslim Middle
East.85
The third factor, therefore, is fear. The Maronites believe that their
culture and religion are threatened with extinction. This threat has
driven them to pursue domination of the state in order to protect their
way of life.86 When their
ultimate control is endagered, the Maronites react perceiving that enemies
intend to eradicate them.
Though accused by other Lebanese of believing
they are a bit more than first among equals, the Maronites' basic fear is
that stripping them of their economic and political prerogatives is the
prelude to driving them from Lebanon.87
The feeling of vulnerability has resulted from Maronite history of
persecution. Furthermore, the Maronites do not distinguish between Arabs
and Muslims, and they see the Middle East as constituting an
"Arabo-Islamic" nationality even though the Arab nationalists have
insisted that nationalism stresses the legacy of Islam rather than the
religion itself.88
Therefore, "all Lebanese Christians perceive as imperiled their survival
as a religious minority trapped in a sea of Islam."89 Thus, the Maronites "reject all
forms of pan-Arabism as nothing more than a mask for pan-Islamism."90 The Maronites believe that
responsibility rests on the Arabs and Muslims to relieve their
fears.91
Unfortunately, the Arab nationalists were not certain how to
respond. Many of the first Arab nationalists had been Lebanese, yet the
Maronites, one minority among several in the country, had disowned their
natural nation.92 As had
been the instance with the Kurds of Iraq, Arab nationalist theory offered
minimal advice regarding how to amend the situation. The works of Sati
al-Husri offered this suggestion:
Everyone who speaks Arabic is an Arab. Everyone
who is affiliated with these people is an Arab. If he does not know this
or if he does not cherish his Arabism, then we must study the reasons for
his position. It may be a result of ignorance--then we must teach him the
truth. It may be because he is unaware or deceived--then we must awaken
him and reassure him. It may be a result of selfishness--then we must
work to limit his selfishness.93
Applying al-Husri's advice, the Arab nationalists attempted to understand
the Maronite position and teach them "the truth" regarding the nationalist
movement. The results were nebulous. The Maronites had rejected the
historical legacy of Islam and now mistrusted the Arab assurances that
nationalism did not stress religion. Yet, "the leaders of the nationalist
movement have always professed the best possible intentions towards the
Christians, and have been quick to disown anything which might give the
opposite impression."94
The
Maronites, however, have not been reassured.
Then the Arabs dedicated themselves to "work to limit the selfishness" of
the Maronites. Probably the Arabs of Lebanon performed their duty to Arab
nationalism unintentionally, because the Muslims, other Arab Christians,
and in fact most groups within Lebanon believed that the system that had
instituted Maronite political hegemony was unfair and they desired more
power for themselves. The Muslims in particular claimed that "the 1943
Pact was born out of a Muslim spirit of accommodation, that it contained
no special safeguards for any particular community, but that it no longer
suited the present situation."95 Both political authority and
financial status, therefore, require redistributing.96 Theh Mulsims proposed that
Lebanon abolish its confessional political structure and practice secular
democracy. As a majority, the Muslims would be sure to gain power from
this arrangement, and the Maronites, as a minority, would lose their
advantage.97 The
Maronites, therefore, accused the Arabs of offering more loyalty to the
Arab national cause than to Lebanon itself.98 As in the past, the Maronites
believed that a threat to their monopoly of power endangered their special
mission for Lebanon. The Maronite refusal to relinquish power has thrown
Lebanon into civil war.
The Maronites, it would seem, have not heeded the words of Michael
'Aflaq:
Confessional differences have distanced an
important section of the Arabs from the Spirit of their country and its
traditions... We wish that a full awakening in Arab Christians of their
nationalism takes place, so that they can see in Islam a nationalist
education for themselves, which they must cherish and fill themselves of
because it is part of their nature and history, and because it is the
arena in which the Arabs have probed their ability in thought, moral
force, and spiritual ascendancy.99
Conflicts between religious groups in Lebanon, therefore, do not result
from intolerance of each other's religion.100 Rather, these conflicts are
typically battles for power or, concerning Arab nationalism, conflicts of
identity rather than confessional schisms. The Maronite desire to
distance themselves from the threat of "Arabo-Islamic" nationalism and
from its seemingly threatening Islamic legacy explains why Maronites do
not subscribe to 'Aflaq's appeal. The Arabs found some success, however,
when this aspect of Arab nationalism received less emphasis in
Lebanon. The Arab desire to incorporate the Maronites into their nation
has resulted in a removal of Islam as a fundamental factor of Arab
nationalism.101
Consequently, many Maronites have begun to recognize their similarities
with the Arabs, including the Muslims. Increasingly, Maronites profess to
being Arab rather than Phoenician. It would appear that the Arab
nationalists have had some success in Lebanon in incorporating a minority
into the nation.
This success is not without its drawbacks. Primarily, a majority of
Maronites still perceive themselves as non-Arabs.102 In addition, the Arab
nationalist theory required reform before the Maronites could consider
assimilating into the Arab nation. As a result, the Arabs of Lebanon do
not relate to the other Arabs as cohesively as was initially expected by
the nationalist philosophers. Consequently, the political culture of
Lebanon associates more with the country's own unique national citizenship
than with the Arab nation.103 As a result, the Lebanese
differ from the Arabs in their opinions regarding Middle Eastern matters
such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the Arabs this issue is certainly
a national concern. For the Lebanese, however, it concerns only the
state.104 Although
eventually the Arabs may successfully unite Lebanon, it will not be a
state embracing Arab nationalism as its political ideology.
Conclusion: Arab Nationalism and Political Culture
As evident from these case studies, Arab nationalism cannot successfully
integrate all minorities into a cohesive political culture without
difficulty. This is the dilemma of all non-civic nationalities that, by
adopting the Germanic view that nations are natural phenomena existing
regardless of choice, these nations encounter resistance by groups within
the country who have selected their own complete nationality. As the
Kurds of Iraq and the Maronites of Lebanon demonstrate, these separate
nations often began with one simple difference that, through history, has
evolved into a complete and separate identity. By establishing the
defining features of the Arab nation, the theorists consequently excluded
groups who identify with only one of these features.
Arab nationalism seems a bad choice for a political ideology in a country
with significant minority populations who feel threatened as a minority in
a nation-state. Yet Arab nationalism could still operate successfully at
the state level. This feat, however, would involve manipulating the
nationalist theories. A.H. Hourani writes regarding the matter,
saying,
In the long run there is only one way in which
the problem of minorities can be solved: majority and minorities must
form a 'community' with one another, must learn to respect and trust one
another, and on the basis of trust and respect work together for common
ends... This does not mean that the differences between them will
competely disappear, for unity does not necessarily imply
uniformity;... It means that both majority and minorities must be
conscious that their loyalties and duties do not stop at the limits of
their racial or religious group, and that every human community must, if
it would avoid falling into mortal sin, make itself the servant of
something higher than itself.105
As altruistic as this idea might sound, however, very few communities are
willing to collaborate in this manner. Writing prophetically, Hourani
adds:
If Arab and Egyptian nationalism should become
essentially Islamic movements, giving the Arab Christians at best an
inferior position on the margin of the national community, then the status
of the religious minorities cannot be improved. Equally, if it adopted a
racial basis the linguistic minorities could not expect any amelioration
of their lot.106
Describing the problems of modern Arab nationslim almost perfectly,
Hourani has attested to the movement's destiny to fail. As stated by
Michael Hudson, the political community of a state must not conflict with
the identities of minorities within the state.107 In fact Hourani expresses his
doubts regarding the integration of two particular groups into the Arab
majority. "There remains two communities which are likely to resist
assimilation: the Maronites of Lebanon and the Kurds of Iraq."108 He suggests that these groups
be granted some autonomy, as what might have been successful in the case
of the Kurds had the two parties agreed on its implementation.109 Although this solution might
be effective in many cases, it does not offer a universal resolution. The
reconciliation between Arab nationalism and the minorities must be
determined on an ad hoc basis and will potentially take many forms,
like the transformation occuring in Lebanon. When applying Arab
nationalism to the state, though, its effects on minorities must not be
ignored.