Party	People’s Army	United Front
Standing committee	Central military commission	United people's district committees
Politburo	Regional military commissions	United people's area committee
Central committee	Sub-regional military commissions	United people's village committees
Regional bureaus (five)	District military commissions	United people's ward committees
Sub-regional bureaus (in some places special sub-regional bureau)	Included in this are: Temporary battalion
District committees	Companies
Area committees	Platoons
Cell committees	Squads (separate people's militias also exist under united village people's committees)

Source: Sudheer Sharma, "The Maoist Movement: An Evolutionary Perspective," in Deepak Thapa, ed., Understanding the Maoist Movement in Nepal, Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, 2003.

At the time when some of us have already started thinking that the revolutionary communism has vanished in the world, there actually begins the era of Nepal’s Maoist rebel coming into the power and growing stronger and stronger everyday.
According to government estimates provided on the CPN-M strength, it is indicated that there are now approximately 10,000 to 15,000 combatants, 8,000 militia, 4,500 cadres, 33,000 hard core followers, and 200,000 sympathizers who are all active across the country with many parts completely under their control. These rebels have been successful in transforming themselves from a small group of shotgun-wielding insurgents in 1996 to the alarming fighting force they are today.The first Maoist attack is believed to have taken place in 1996, when six government and police outposts were attacked all together in mid western Nepal. Similar other attacks took place frequently in the same area over the next few years. Initially the rebels were taken seriously at all by the government, diplomats, journalists or the all-pervasive aid agencies that dominate Nepal’s economy amid they were lightly armed and didn’t count as a genuine military threat. But since the first attack, they have become one of the South Asia’s most potent rebel groups, rivaling the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka. Today the Maoists are well organized. The Maoists movement and their forces are very well organized and highly disciplined with their firepower at disposal greater than ever. Many rifles and explosives have been stolen from captured police outposts and it is also believed that the country’s open borders with India have made it easier to smuggle arms and money. The rebels have become so powerful that few dare to defy their call for a general strike in Kathmandu. Their threat to cut off the city from the rest of the country is no longer neglected. It is known that they conducted a campaign in the summer of 2004 abducting hundreds of school children for a week long “re-education” course on Maoist ideology right under the noses of security forces on the suburbs of Kathmandu. They are virtually in control of most of the rural Nepal and they have enforced blockades of major towns and cities, showing their power to paralyze the economy. It seemed like the Royal Nepalese armies are there to prove to be the much of a match for the Maoists when they go onto fighting on the Maoists territory, the hills of Nepal. The army is better equipped, but the mountainous terrain and popular support in some areas greatly favors the rebels. They melt away into the hills when troops arrive in force.

The CPN generally uses a combination of mass line and united front to gain local support but will use terror in areas where support comes more slowly. Such incidents have increased as the CPN has moved out of its traditional areas of support. In some areas, especially in the Mid-West where the CPN has firm control of the area and government control is considerably limited, the CPN acts as the defacto government. The CPN was originally centered in the border area of Rolpa and Rukkum districts in the Mid-West. Since the CPN lacks the drug income that has helped to finance FARC and the Shining Path, the CPN relies on bank-robbing, kidnapping-for-ransom, and extortion to get added funds, which have in fact not been able to allow for rapid expansion of the CPN. While nonviolent means were important in base areas, terror was widely used when expanding into disputed areas, ultimately culminating with the November 2001 general offensive. Generally, the tactics used in taking over a village include incapacitating the village leader and leaving an absence of power that could only be filled by the CNP. The police, poorly armed and considerably spread-out, are generally powerless to do anything. Thomas A. Marks describes one interesting tactic used to deal with the local police force includes beginning with a small attack to draw the attention of the local police forces and thus spread out their numbers. Once this has occurred, small guerrilla units attack the smaller, more isolated police forces, which in turn force the police to consolidate their forces, ultimately leaving larger swaths of the local population at the mercy of the insurgents. Other tactics included cutting roads, bridges, or power to a region to isolate it and then begin the socialist process.

The fighting and support forces of Maoists consist of mainly (castes) Magars, Tharus, Janjatis (Gurungs, Rais, Limbus, Tamangs, Dalits, Brahmins and Chhetris). Among the Maoist fighters, about 60 per cent are set out in the mid-west and west in their strongholds whereas another 10 per cent are in the far west with around 10 percent in Gorkha. The rest is located in Kathmandu valley and east of it.

A significant number of retired Gurkha soldiers of the British and the Indian Army inhabit many of the Maoist-affected areas. Nepalese security agencies have suspected that some of these former soldiers along with those retired and deserters from the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) are involved in training the insurgents. Women have been prominent in the recruiting profile. Available reports indicate that one-fifth to one-third of the cadre and combatants may be women. Reportedly, every village has a revolutionary women’s organization. According to a Jane’s Intelligence Review report of October 2001, there are usually two women in each unit of 35-40 men, and they are used to gather intelligence and act as couriers. Baburam Bhattarai was quoted as saying in Spacetime on April 18, 2003, that fifty percent of cadres at the lower level, thirty percent of soldiers and ten percent of members of central committee of the outfit were women. Durgha Pokhrel, Chairman of National Women’s Commission, who visited more than 25 Maoist-affected districts, stated on July 3, 2003, during a talk delivered at the Nepal Council of World Affairs that percentage of women cadres could be as high as forty. A women’s group, the All Nepal Women's Association (Revolutionary), is alleged to be a front outfit of the CPN-M.
The All Nepal National Independent Students’ Union (Revolutionary), or ANNISU-R is the student wing of the Maoists. Its membership comprises students from school to the university level. The general success in all the strikes called by ANNISU-R, especially in the educational institutions, (at present it is also one of the key student organisation in the anti-King agitation) shows the strong hold of the organisation. According to a report of  June 2003, the ANNISU-R comprises approximately 400,000 members. Reportedly, weaponry in their possession include AK-47 rifles, self-loading rifles, .303 rifles, country guns, hand grenades, explosives, detonators, mortars, and light machine guns. Nearly 85 per cent of these weapons are reportedly looted from the police and RNA. Both sides in Nepals civil war, the security forces and these rebels, have been seen using British arms dating from World War I and World War II, notably the Lee-Enfield rifle, the Bren Machine gun, and the Sten Submachine gun, as well as 1950s vintage AK-47 rifles and FN SLR rifles.