Current Events and State
of Affairs:
The
current government in power in Sudan is that of Islamic fundamentalists
under the leadership of President Omer Hassan El Bahir. Bahir engineered
a coup d'etat in June of 1989 to bring the National Islam Front
(NIF) regime into power before the DUP /SPLA (Democratic Unionist
Party/Sudan Peoples Liberation Army) Agreement between the government
and the SPLA could be signed, an agreement which promised hope for
peace between the Northern and Southern Sudanese. President Bashir'
s NIF government has remained in power since the coup, and is the
operating and negotiating government of present.
Slavery
in our modern times continues to exist in Sudan due to the
same
problems which have fueled ceaseless civil war in this counrtry
for the last 19 years, and on and off for almost a half century.
The Northern Sudanese of mostly Arab nationality and Islamic/Muslim
religious groups, under the NIF government and militia, have inflicted
racial and religious persecution on the Southern Sudanese consisting
of mostly black African descent and Christian or anamist religious
affiliations. In compliance with Muslim/Islamic law, the Muslim-led
NIF government refused to recognize relative distinctions between
state and religious governance. Ethnic, religious, and cultural
diversity lie at the root of the upheaval of a government bent on
imposing Arab/Islamic/Muslim rule, sharia law, and religious conversion
within a country so diversified that over 400 languages are spoken
there. Unwilling to respect or accept the cultural and religious
ancestry of an entire nation of people in the Southern Sudanese,
while trying to crush their identities with hate, human rights violations,
and genocide, the present government until very recently perpetuated
the continuance of an
oppressive civil war.
Complicating
the already troublesome instabilites of the Sudan produced by civil
war and a forceful militia government was the discovery of oil in
the late 1970s, and thus the introduction of oil production as an
economic resource in the region. One might assume this resource
to be an economic blessing in a region plagued by poverty, drought
and famine, but oil in the Sudan became anything but an answer to
their prayers. The prospects of wealthy oil production caused a
promising period of peace in Sudan under the Addis Ababa Agreement
of 1972 to collapse. Although President Gaefer El Nimeri had proposed
regional self-government for South Sudan when he came into power,
under the Addis Ababa Agreement the southern regional government
was allowed no representation in the Central government denying
autonomous control over its government. Thus the balance of power
still rendered weight to North Sudan over South Sudan and rendered
a volatile agreement exposed to the prospects of exploitation of
all the same counter-serving policies as in the past. Peace within
a fragile government system remained in spite of Sudan's less than
equitable living conditions under the Nimeri dictatorship until
1983.
In
1983, oil became the spark to ignite the resurgence of war. Upon
the discovery of oil in South Sudan the Nimeri government broke
its promises under the Addis Ababa Agreement. With the potential
for wealth at stake, the government denied further power to the
Southern Sudanese government and re-imposed Islamic law (Sharia)
on all of Sudan. By declaring Sudan a strictly Islamic state, Nimeri
religiously and politically oppressed South Sudan. Religiously,
of course, by not recognizing their rights to Christian or anamist
religions, and politically because under Muslim law, non-Muslims
would be forbidden to hold political office. Therefore, the Southern
Sudanese would have no control over the wealth produced within their
region. (See "Oil In Sudan" at www.southsudanfriends.org/issues/oil000614.html
). As the Sudanese government initiated moves to build pipelines
for the oil in Port Sudan to be refined in the North, war resumed.
The main reasons, then, for the revival of war in Sudan was "1)
lack of economic development; 2) the location of a new oil refinery
at Port Sudan instead of Bentiu; 3) attempts to annex Bentiu oil
fields to North Sudan and 4) the imposition of sharia law.
Why
do we care about the revival of war in 1983 when speaking of slavery
in the Sudan in these modern times? The aforementioned divisions
have remained as core elements fueling the present militia government's
efforts under President Bashir to maintain anarchy in the South,
and build a more powerful and wealthy regime through the minority
Arab/Muslim population of the North. Ironically, the Sudan's wealth
from oil has mostly been reinvested into military spending for the
civil war with the control of the oil business at its crux, and
so thus far has not served to elevate the economy. The Khartoum
government has ruthlessly protected its control of the oil fields
by forcing yet more civilians to leave. The war has predominantly
been fought between the Sudanese government and the SPLA, but other
rebel forces also exist. The most largely affected by the civil
war have been the civilians. According to reports, as of January
31, 2002, almost 2 million people had been killed since 1983, and
more than 4 million had been displaced. The government is able to
maintain power under the division of forces in Sudan, and with the
lack of threat posed by the displaced and poverty-stricken civilians.
The
government supports the slave-trade by arming and sanctioning raids
by tribal militias. Particuarly, they back the militia of the Baggara
tribes of the north (known as muraheleen) in their raids upon the
Dinka population residing in the southern region of Bahr El Ghazal.
The government's sanctioning of the slave trade serves as a "low-cost
part of its counterinsurgency"_ against the SPLA which is identified
with the Dinkas. (See "Slavery and Slave Redemption in the Sudan"
at www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sudanupdate.htm).
Captured slaves consist of women and children (many men are slaughtered
rather than taken) held in conditions of slavery forced to work
without compensation, punished if they disobey their captors or
masters, and often mentally, physically and sexually abused. Many
accounts of gross human rights abuses of these people have been
reported, and some escaped slaves have told their stories to the
world. They are treated as chattel.
Certain
logical questions, then, should follow this exposure such as: “Who
are the oil companies involved in production in Sudan, and are they
complicit by their presence in supporting Sudan’s slavery? How does
the oil industry in Sudan enhance the slave trade and human rights
violations in Sudan? With the importance that the power and wealth
of oil yield in Sudan, should these oil companies be wielding their
influence to press for the termination of slavery, and are they?
What benefits, if any, do the oil companies reap by not interfering
in the present conditions in Sudan?”
Oil
was discovered in Sudan in 1978, but oil discoveries in Sudan in
the mid-1990s made Sudan an important participant on the world oil
market. Foreign oil investors were compelled to compete for their
share of this market, regardless of conscienable sanctions being
imposed on Sudan to produce economic pressure to conform to human
rights standards. The rich lake of oil under the Sudan earth, according
to a 2002 report, presently produces “200,000 barrrels a day and
is expected to double by 2005. Oil already accounts for up to 40
percent of government revenues.” Wealthy conglomerates began extensive
exploration in the 90s. One of the earler and main conglomerates
involved in oil exploration is the Great Nile Petroleum and Oil
Corporation (GNPOC) in Heglig. GNPOC is comprised of the China National
Petroeum Corporation (CNPC) which has a 40% share in the union,
Petronas, owned by the Malaysian government with a 30% share, Talisman
Energy, a privately-owned Canadian company, with a 25% share, and
Sudapet, with a 5% share is owned by the Government of Sudan. GNPOC
surfaces in many discussions of Sudan on the world watch and news
reports of oil activity in Sudan since this consortium owns the
sites in the two main production areas, called Unity (Block 1) and
Heglig (Block 2). However, companies from many countries now have
joined in investing in Sudan’s oil exploration, including Britain,
Sweden, Austria, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and some unnamed
companies within consortiums that remain unidentified along with
their country of origin. The latest country on the block to tap
into Sudan’s oil wealth is Russia, which just signed a $200 million
dollar deal with the Sudan government to develop new oil fields
in central Sudan. This is an important international development
since this agreement is expected to be “part of an emerging relationship
between the two countries that will increase Russia’s influence
in the continent and strengthen Sudan’s domestic arms,” not to mention
Russia’s wealth and prosperity.
Problems
that have been created by oil development in Sudan include huge
displacement of civilians, destruction of harvests, and looting
livestock to clear and protect the vast sites of oilfields. The
displacements have accelerated an unnatural progression of famine
to areas already in danger from the common natural occurrences of
drought. As part of the summarily executed displacements, brutal
attacks on innocent civilians have been reported and documented,
including bombings of villages, schools, churches and hospitals
by air attack, cruel, torturous acts such as nailing women and children
to trees with spikes, mass executions, killing men by pounding nails
into their foreheads, the rapes and abductions of women, and the
abduction of children for slave-trading or ransom, to name just
some.
As
well, the government stations militias at the oil development sites
to protect its interests from opposing militia and rebel factions.
In order to provide enough troops, the government imposed a conscription
law for men and women to train for the military Popular Defence
Force (PDF) as holy war fighters (mujahedin) fighting a jihad. It
was installed as a pre-condition to entering universities, for taking
final tests in college, for any higher education, or for pursuit
of higher employment. Men must serve in active combat, though women
are not used actively as frontline fighters. Brigades sent to protect
the oilfields are considered frontline fighters and are mobilized
as mujahedin, being promised that they will become martyrs if they
die in the war. Other rebel militias allied with the government
or with the SPLA often switch sides depending on the incentives
offered, especially power and the supply of arms. According to some
estimates, inter-factional fighting accounts for more deaths amongst
the Southern Sudanese than combat with government forces. Control
over the oilfields provides powerful incentive to assemble forces
based on ethnic origin for both sides. The government has determined
it to be beneficial to their power, then, to arm power-hungry rebel
militias of certain ethnic descent to protect the oilfields against
the SPLA. This practice enforces a divide and rule strategy based
on ethnicity, and has encouraged present human rights violations.
Another
violation spurred by oil development is the government’ s gridlock
on airfields, especially those in areas in proximity to oilfields.
The Government of Sudan has heavily invested oil wealth in weaponry
bought and imported from other countries, and has monopolized the
airfields for arms deliveries, and for oil companies’ needs. Whether
or not these are the reasons for persistent denials of humanitarian
access of recent or not is unknown. What is known is that the govnerment
of Sudan has stirred great condemnation from many countries and
the United Nations for its continued sporadic denial of humanitarian
operations sponsored by the United Nations as coordinated by its
sanctioned Operation Lifeline Sudan (U.N./OLS). U.N./OLS, “established
in 1989 in response to the conflict-related famine in the South
[Sudan], is a tripartite agreement of negotiated access among the
GOS [Government of Sudan], the SPLM, and the United Nations (U.N.).
Under this framework, a consortuim of U.N. agencies and more than
40 international and indigenius non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
provide emergency relief and rehabilitation assistance in Sudan.
In addition, more than ten international NGOs provide humanitarian
assistance outside of the U.N./OLS consortium. We will examine the
role of these international actors in the next page.
The
oil companies have a responsibility to the Sudanese people to play
supportive roles in pressuring the government to find a peace settlement,
and to terminate human rights violations as a condition of their
presence in Sudan. To not do so, makes them accomplices to continuing
political instability producing starvation and perpetuating crimes
against humanity, and human rights violations. Unfortunately, the
wheel is already in motion for oil production in Sudan without any
sanctions being imposed for many companies from many countries.
Some companies have at times ceased production because of safety
issues as escalation of violence near their oilfields have forced
them to take refuge. Some companies, though, such as Fosters Resources,
a Canadian oil company backed out of an oil production contract
with the Sudanese government to drill in Sudan in May, 2000. According
to a National Post article, the company cited as its reason to choose
default, “media coverage that painted its project as ‘a plot to
fuel civil war.”
Note:
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