The Japanese Ambassador came in at my request.
He then referred to a conversation between Ambassador Grew and Foreign Minister
Arita, before the Ambassador recently left Tokyo for America, in which Mr. Arita
had brought up (1) the idea of our two countries exercising their influence
toward avoiding war in Europe; (2) the reported apprehension of my Government
that the Japanese occupation of the Hainan Islands is part of a plan of permanent
military conquest; and (3) my Government's concern about the extent of possible
injury and loss of American interests, including American trade, in China, by
reason of possible permanent Japanese policies of control. He said he would
be interested in anything I might have to say on these points.
Point 3. I said that, taking the last point first, I need not remind him that for six years I had been earnestly pleading with and urging upon his Government the view that there is enough room on this planet for fifteen or eighteen great nations like his and mine, and that by cooperating along progressive and mutually desirable lines, great progress of the entire world population would gradually follow, etc., etc.
Point 2. I said that, on the other hand, while present American interests
and rights in the Far East are highly important, the big consideration relates
to the question whether all of China and the Pacific islands skirting it is
to be Manchuria-ized by Japan, with international law destroyed and treaty observation
abolished and all other nations not allowed into that one-half of the world-the
door shut and locked by Japan except over preferences for her own citizens.
I added that if some one nation is to do this in one-half of the world, some
other nation in the other half of the world might undertake to follow the same
example, and nothing would be more absurdly impossible for the future progress
of the population of the world, including the countries assuming this species
of domination, than such attempted course. I proceeded further to say that the
Ambassador might suppose an announcement that this hemisphere and a part of
Europe would be foreclosed against his country in the sense of being Manchuria-ized,
and added that I need not speculate on what his country would think and how
it would feel. I said that such efforts at domination, with no facilities for
financing and progressive development, and the going forward on such a huge
scale, could only result in disaster for all concerned, speaking, of course,
from my viewpoint, and that this general idea had been urged by me on his statesmen
for six years.
Point 1. As to the question raised with Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister
Arita about the possible cooperation of our two countries to compose the threatened
dangers of Europe, I said that the single test of my Government in dealing with
other Governments relates to the question of peace; that we consider the preservation
of peace so supremely important to the future of all nations that we draw the
line between honest, law-abiding, peaceful countries and peoples, without reference
to their form of government, on the one hand, and those who are flouting law
and order and officially threatening military conquest without limit as to time
or extent; that we will work in a friendly spirit with every peaceful nation
to promote and preserve peace, without serious thought as to who they are; that
while we have not the slightest alliance, or secret or other understandings
with any nation on earth, and do not propose to have any, we will keep thoroughly
armed and prepared to take care of our interests and rights; that we have, in
the spirit I was describing, made every kind and character of plea to the countries
of Europe to indicate a willingness for the peaceful settlement and adjustment
of their economic and other relations, and we have indicated our readiness to
cooperate in every feasible plan to restore international trade and finance
to a normal basis; that, notwithstanding these earnest pleas, (which the Japanese
Government itself might well have been making, if it; has not been doing so,
or might well make now and persistently in the future,) nations perhaps could
not but take notice that Japan herself is engaged in military operations for
purposes of conquest, and that this situation might well call for an ending,
if Japan were to exercise her fullest influence along with the United States
and other countries in efforts to compose threatened military conquest in other
parts of the world.
The Ambassador made no particular comment, except to state that there had been reports in this country to the effect that Japan might enter into a military pact with Germany and Italy, whereas the truth is that his country has no idea of doing so; that Japan, because of its proximity and difficulties with Russia, has been interested in the anti-Comintern policy of certain European states and in working with them against Bolshevism. I replied that, of course, this was primarily the business of his country; that my country . . . abstains from any entanglements or involvements with European countries; that, of course, if Japan desires to tie herself up with the horribly complicated European controversies, so as to make herself immediately involved in any European war, that still was her business primarily; and I might again reiterate that my Government is keeping itself in a detached position, with peace as its supreme objective, and with armaments sufficient for all purposes of security.
C [ORDELL] H [ULL]
Source: U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943, pp. 464-467
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