These two great organisations of the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage. For my own part, looking out upon the future, I do not view the process with any misgivings. I could not stop it if I wished; no one can stop it. Like the Mississippi, it just keeps rolling along. Let it roll. Let it roll on full flood, inexorable, irresistible, benignant, to broader lands and better days.
Winston Churchill, August 1940
Hegemony exercised by a single state is a rare and transient phenomenon in the history of the world system. A unified world polity has been much slower to emerge than a unified world economy. Some state functions have come to be discharged at international level, but most remain rooted in national state structures. When hegemony has been exercised it has been directed more at promoting international monetary stability, improving global communications, securing property rights and enforcing contracts, rather than at conferring wider political rights, stabilising the global economy, redistributing income and wealth, or promoting balanced development.
States find it difficult to retain hegemony for very long; once lost it cannot be regained. But the few examples of hegemony that have existed raise interesting questions about the nature of the world system and the conditions under which a more permanent apparatus of central authority might emerge. Awareness of the need for such central authority in the twentieth century has been keenest among the elites of those states which have exercised hegemony. Such elites tend to think in world-system terms, developing discourses which identify the requirements for international political and economic stability.
Many of the most important geopolitical perspectives in the twentieth century have as a result originated in Britain or the United States, 1 often displaying a set of similar conceptions and concerns. Theorists like Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder put forward the idea of a strategic partnership between the two states to manage the world system and maintain world order. According to Mahan, 'the United States has certainty of a very high other that the British Empire will stand substantially on the same lines of world privileges as ourselves; that its strength will be our strength, and its weakening an injury to us' . 2 As collaboration between the two states developed, an influential strand of British political opinion came to designate the United States not just as Britain's partner but as its natural successor to the leading role in the world system.
These elites were motivated partly by cultural and ideological affinities, but also by the perception that both states shared an interest in promoting the conditions for a liberal international order. There were important differences between them, but nonetheless, sufficient common ground to make collaboration possible and to encourage the idea, particularly on the British side, of a project to transfer the role and responsibilities which Britain had once exercised as a hegemonic power to the United States. In this way a transfer of hegemony was engineered between the two powers, which rested on collaboration rather than conflict. In the period of Britain's decline as a hegemonic power, British elites became divided on whether British security was best protected by an open world economy--which required acceptance of United States leadership--or by maintenance of an exclusive sphere of influence through its empire. The decisive historical choice, which Britain made in 1940 and was confirmed by all governments since 1945, was in favour of the former. Its most tangible symbol was the alliance with the United States. The importance of being at the heart of an expanding world economy was in the end judged molt important than the preservation of a regional sphere of interest.
It is in this context that the problem of British decline should be viewed. Some historians have come to regard the explanation of British industrial decline as the central problem of twentieth century British historiography. 3 But industrial decline is only one aspect of a much bigger problem, the decline of Britain as a world power. This decline is intimately connected to the question of hegemony. In the course of the twentieth century Britain was displaced as a world power, losing its empire and its commercial, financial, technological and ideological hegemony. The industrial decline creates a particular puzzle--why having paid the penalty of being the leader and having fallen behind, did it take Britain so long to catch up? 4 But this issue is inextricably related to the bigger question of how Britain gradually relinquished the last vestiges of its own hegemony and accepted the hegemony of the United States, emerging in the l940s as the principal ally of the United States, a role which it has never since lost. There was nothing pre-ordained about this outcome. Earlier in the century some observers, including Leon Trotsky, expected there to be military conflict between Britain and the United States in order to settle the question of world leadership, 5 Trotsky arguing that this was the way in which hegemony passed from a declining power to a rising power. But no such conflict took place. On the contrary so smooth was the transfer of hegemony between the two powers that the last one hundred and fifty years can sometimes appear as a single unbroken hegemony exercised by the Anglo-Saxons over the rest of the world.
Hegemony has been defined in several different ways, but two are of particular importance. The first is associated with world-systems theory, which challenged the notion of discrete and autonomous national economic development associated with modernisation theory. Instead, national economic development was considered part of the development of capitalism, which from its very beginnings was not a national but a world system. Capitalism according to world-systems theory is based on two fundamental forces; firstly, an expanding division of labour and a network of trade and finance which steadily draws more and more territories and populations into relationships of exchange and interdependence; and secondly, a competition between territorially based states, This competition developed between the states with the greatest economic, military, technological, administrative and cultural capacities at the centre of the world system, aimed at the control and exploitation of less developed regions and populations in the periphery. The complex interaction and competition between states, households, ethnic groups, and business enterprises for comparative advantage makes the capitalist world system highly dynamic. As Immanuel Wallerstein puts it: 'its life is made up of conflicting forces which hold it together by tension, and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remould it to its advantage'.6
The key feature of the world system is that as an economy it displays ever-greater tendency to cohesion and interconnectedness, but as a polity it remains fragmented. It has never been transformed into a universal empire, although one or two adventurers in the last two hundred years have made the attempt. It has been united more by economics than by politics, but the political disunity arising as it does in a context of a dynamic and rapidly expanding cosmopolitan system of commerce and finance, has also often been the spur to expansion, as well as resulting in a highly unequal distribution of income and resources. Strong states arose to protect and promote the national advantage of their citizens within the expanding global economy.
This imbalance between the economic and the political in the world system predated industrialisation, but industrialisation intensified it. In the international state-system, nation-states have remained the focus of decision-making and legitimacy; international institutions have been slow to develop and have not kept pace with economic integration. Problems arise because international institutions are needed to create and sustain the conditions for a global economic order. The type of governance that is necessary to sustain national markets is also necessary for global markets. States can enforce rates within the territories they control-the problem is the exchanges, which spill over state frontiers.
A global economy requires the supply of certain functions if it is to function satisfactorily. A global polity would be one means of providing these but it is not the only one. Another alternative is that one of the states in the international state system is so dominant that it exercises hegemony over the other leading states and can either impose or get agreement to a system of international rights and norms. Such a condition of hegemony develops when one state has such economic supremacy that no other state or combination of states is able to challenge it effectively. The main dimensions of economic supremacy lie in production (technological lead), commerce (share of world trade), and finance (international credit and currency). If a state enjoys supremacy in all three areas it possesses the ability to exercise hegemony, and to some extent to assume state functions for the whole of the world system as though it were the central authority.
The second perspective draws on the understanding of hegemony associated with Gramsci. 7 The exercise of power entails the use of both coercion and consent, and the most stable polities are those where consent is prominent. The focus is less on the structural factors, which establish the possibility of hegemony as on the way in which power is accepted as legitimate through ideological and cultural persuasion. The emphasis is on how a particular conception of world order is created and sustained through a myriad of agencies and organisations, and the incorporation of many different interests into an overarching political project. The ideological aspect of hegemony is what is most significant about it.
The hegemony that is based on the economic supremacy of individual states tends to be short-lived, in part because of the existence of hegemony itself, If one state has economic supremacy and uses it to promote an era of prosperity and advance in the global economy, rivals will soon develop as other leading states organise to close the gap in productivity, technology, mid investment. Such rivalry if it is not held in check may produce increasing friction and eventually war. A second problem is what happens to the hegemonic state itself. A tension develops between maintaining a global role and preserving a strong economic capability through new technology and investment. Paul Kennedy has pointed to a conflict, which arises for such states between security, consumption, and investment, 8 leading to a condition of imperial overstretch. The pressures for spending to boost public and private consumption and military security tend to crowd out the pressures for industrial investment. The elites in the hegemonic state become more interested in attending to the problems of world order and managing the global polity than to concentrating on the long-term needs of their domestic economy. In this way rivals are assisted. They can free-ride on the back of the hegemonic power.
Periods of true economic supremacy have been short-lived, but once a state has exercised hegemony it is usually reluctant to relinquish it. In the twentieth century Britain sought to maintain its global role long after the conditions for the automatic exercise of its hegemony had passed. Reflection on its failure prompted one of the most influential arguments in favour of hegemony. Charles Kindleberger argued that once the hegemon is no longer able to exercise its power, the result is conflict and a breakdown of world economic order. He explained the 1930s depression in this way. Britain was no longer able to enforce the rules of a liberal world order and the United States was not ready to. 9
Britain's period of economic supremacy on which its hegemony was founded developed after 1815. It established a clear lead in finance, commerce and industry, and London was recognised as the undisputed centre of the worlds financial and commercial system. By 1870 the London market was twice as large as the capital markets of its rivals combined, and sterling had become the leading international currency By 1914 British foreign investments had reached £4,000 million, providing a render income of £200 million per annum. This economic supremacy was not so dependent on a manufacturing export surplus, as once thought. Its real basis was the surplus earned from financial and commercial services. Britain was a commercial and financial power before industry developed, and the new wealth and opportunities which industry brought were exploited within the framework of the global relationships which had already been created. The wealth from industry changed the balance of the British economy by making the preservation of agricultural self-sufficiency unnecessary. The number of Britons fed on foreign wheat rose six times between 1820 and 1850. 10
The commitment to free trade became the symbol of British policy in the middle of the nineteenth century. It followed a commercial rather than an industrial logic. British prosperity and the feeding of its growing population came to depend on the maintenance of the network of trading relationships which now covered the whole world and whose centre was London. Britain had a strong interest in preserving the free movement of goods, capital and labour in this world economy when British manufacturing industries enjoyed a technological lead over those in other countries. What was more surprising was that Britain's attachment to this policy took so long to diminish even when this lead began to be eroded.
British hegemony was different from American in several key respects. Britain was dependent on trade to a much greater extent than the United Stales. It needed a visible trade deficit rather than a visible trade surplus in order to stimulate economic development in other parts of the world economy which boosted demand for British banking, shipping, and insurance services. A policy of autarchy and protection never made sense for Britain. The British national interest became maintaining the openness of the world economy. For a long while the United States had no such interest. It acquired one only later when it needed to find a way to absorb the huge American visible export surplus. A second difference was that in addition to its informal commercial empire, Britain had also acquired an extensive formal empire, with direct administrative responsibilities, and this formal empire continued to increase in size up to 1918. Britain's commitment to universalism and the open world economy was qualified by its interest in protecting its sphere of interest within the world economy. While the United Stales developed its own sphere of interest it did not rule directly. The military commitment underpinning the two hegemonies was also very different. The Pax Britannica required a naval budget of only £8 million, 11 while the Pax Americana has seen the construction of the most extensive system of military bases in the history of the world. US hegemony has been exercised through a series of military alliances, whereas Britain generally acted alone.
Britain's period of undisputed hegemony lasted through the middle decades of the nineteenth century. In this period the ideal of a liberal world order, founded on principles of global free trade, security of contract, and private property first took practical shape. In the final decades of that century Britain faced a growing military and industrial challenge from new rivals, particularly Germany and the United States. Both moved to protect their new industrial sectors from British competition and both contested the inclusion of so much of the world in Britain's sphere of influence through formal colonial links and through the informal links of investment and trade. At the same time both increasingly exploited the open access to the British market which adherence to the policy of free trade allowed. The impact of this on British politics was dramatic. It created the first great bout of introspection about economic decline amidst fears that British industry could no longer compete with the energy and technological sophistication of the Americans and the Germans. 12
The challenge to Britain's position was both military and economic, and faced the British state with a serious strategic dilemma. Either it had to come to terms with its new rivals or it had to fight them. In the end it did both. The commitment to an open world economy came under severe pressure. Britain defended itself by seeking to enlarge its own sphere of influence. As Halford Mackinder explained: 'Under a condition of universal free trade, the dream of the sixties of the last century, industrial life and empire might be dissociated, but when competing countries seek to monopolise markets by means of customs tariffs, even democracies are compelled to annex empires. In the last two generations ... the object of vast British annexations has been to support a trade open to all the world'. 13
In the first decade of the twentieth century there was a major debate in Britain on the merits of the formal as against the informal empire. At the height of Britain's hegemony in the middle decades of the century, the claims of the formal empire were much diminished. At its crudest, the case for free trade imperialism was that foreign nations could be made valuable colonies without the expense or responsibility of governing them; 14 but there was also an argument of principle. In a memorandum written in 1907 Eyre Crowe argued: 15
Second only to the ideal of independence, nations have always cherished the right of free intercourse and trade in the world's markets, and in proportion as England champions the principle of the largest measure of general freedom of commerce, she undoubtedly strengthens her hold on the interested friendship of other nations, at least to the extent of making them less apprehensive of naval supremacy in the hands of a free trade England than they would in the face of a predominant protectionist power
The alternative view was put by those like Milner who thought that Britain's priority should be the development of its Empire, whatever the consequences for the open world economy. They argued that the best way for Britain to retain its naval supremacy was through a protectionist economy, which safeguarded the British manufacturing base. Joseph Chamberlain and Alfred Milner spearheaded the attack on free trade: 16
Let us free ourselves from the insane delusion that a nation grows richer by buying outside its borders what it can produce within them. It is not a blessing when, in the blind worship of cheapness, we undermine our own industries. Now is the time to strike a blow to free ourselves from the shackles of an antique creed, to open the door, which has been banged and barred against our fellow-countrymen in the Dominions.
The transfer of hegemony between Britain and the United States went through three stages. In the first stage, from the early years of the century until 1940, Britain acquiesced in the United States establishing its own sphere of interest in the Americas; British and American interests came to be treated as complementary rather than as antagonistic. Britain continued to rule its Empire but ceded priority to the United States in South America and parts of the Caribbean. Each power might thus enjoy its own sphere of interest and co-operate in the task of maintaining international order.
The key episodes, which marked the beginning of this stage, which was so crucial for later developments, began in the 1890s. In 1895/6 Washington intervened in a boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guyana, and after reflection Britain conceded the right of the United States to do so. It was followed by Britain's decision to give up its half share in the planned isthmian canal and to withdraw its navy from the western hemisphere. No formal treaty was ever signed but Britain through its actions recognised the United States declaration that the Americas lay within its sphere of influence. There were strategic, economic, and ideological reasons for this decision. The option of opposing the rising power of the United States was considered but quickly rejected. In 1901 the Admiralty, asked to advise on the feasibility of a war against the United States, replied that command of the American seas would only be possible if the neutrality of the European powers could be assured. 17 Since this was impossible it underlined that Britain needed the friendship and co-operation of the United States and needed to ensure that the United States was at least neutral in any European conflict in which Britain became involved.
The strategic argument was reinforced by economic and ideological factors. The two economies were closely linked. There were substantial British investments in the United States and a large volume of trade, Neither side needed territory, which the other controlled. There were many more advantages in co-operating than in fighting. The common cultural and ideological heritage of the English-speaking peoples was also beginning to be deployed, with the propagation of ideas of an Anglo-Saxon race and the need for Anglo-Saxon unity.
The entry of the United States on the side of Britain and France in the First World War was taken as a sign of the growing understanding between Britain and the United States and evidence that their interests were compatible rather than in conflict. But the war also demonstrated that the United States was potentially a world power, not just a regional power, and this changed the relative position of Britain and the United States irrevocably. After the war the United States insisted that it should henceforward enjoy naval parity with Britain. One of the results of the war was that the United States emerged as both the leading creditor nation, and the leading industrial power in the world economy.
But despite the signs of the growing power and importance of the United States, and the ambitions of some of its political class, symbolised by Woodrow Wilson's commitment to build a new international political and economic order, the United States was not ready to take a hegemonic role in the world system and moved back to its traditional isolationist stance. The dislocation of the global economy by World War I created a series of intractable problems in the way of recreating the conditions for prewar prosperity, and these came to seem insoluble when the international financial system collapsed in 1931, signaling the start of a long and damaging slump. The growth of economic nationalism and the splitting up of the world into protectionist currency blocs in the 1930s demonstrated sharply both the desirability of an international economic order and also the difficulty of achieving one without the co-operation of the United States. Alter the collapse of the gold standard the world economy fragmented into currency blocs and protected spheres of interest, which reduced trade and output and contributed to the rise of regimes committed to the redistribution of territory by force.
The second stage in the partnership between Britain and the United States was initiated by the alliance between Britain and the United States to fight Germany and Japan in the Second World War, which was preceded by the Lend-Lease agreement. The formation of a Coalition Government in Britain and the decision to abandon appeasement and to wage all-cut war necessitated a sharp break with both the domestic and the foreign policies of British governments in the 1930s. The dependence of Britain upon the United States, which began with the Lend-Lease agreement, was much more marked than in 1914-18. The United States demanded a high price for its support. The Atlantic Charter, agreed in 1941, set out plans for a reconstruction of the international economic order on universal principles, which implied the dismantling of all protected spheres of interest, including the British Empire. Much of the drive behind United States thinking came from the State Department under Cordell Hull. He described the 1932 Ottawa agreements, which had established imperial preference within the British Empire. as 'the greatest injury, in a commercial way, that has been inflicted on this country since I have been in public life'. 18
The Atlantic Charter was a key statement of United States policy, marking a turn away from the sphere-of-interest politics which had dominated the 1930s. At that time the United States accepted the political division of the world market and had even floated the idea of a super bloc--the Grand Area--which would have included the Americas, Britain and the British Empire, and much of East Asia, including China and Japan. This bloc was intended to counterbalance Germany and the Soviet Union. 19 With the entry of the United States into the war, more ambitious ideas were floated. The Grand Area was now envisaged as the basis for a reconstructed world order under United States leadership. Germany and the Soviet Union were both included within it on condition that they along with Britain and Japan agreed to give up their protected spheres of interest. In the case of the European powers, a particular concern of the United States was that they should be forced to give up their colonies.
The United States Government was divided between those who favoured a special relationship with Britain in order to build a stable international economic order, and those who were against making any concessions to Britain that were not made to all other countries. This difference of view made negotiations over the shape of the postwar order protracted, and many of the more ambitious plans were never realised. The hopes for an early resumption of multilateral trade and convertible currencies had to be postponed. The British and US delegations at Bretton Woods put forward different plans, and the final compromise was shaped more by the latter than the former. It was still attacked in both countries. In the US there was a strong lobby, which opposed any departure from the principles of sound finance, and supported the re-establishment of the gold standard, because this would rule out any discretionary rules aimed at providing credit for countries which were constantly in deficit.
The British view was different. The collapse of the international financial system between the wars had left deep scars. There was strong attachment to the policy of maintaining a protected sphere of interest as the foundation for international economic order, and scepticism that order could be restored on the basis of the old universal principles. Support for protectionism was especially solid among the supporters of tariff reform in the Conservative party, but it had become the dominant view in the Labour party as well. The decline of the Liberal party meant that support for the old principles was much weaker. But certain fundamentals had not changed, and the liberal tradition was still powerful. Many Liberals like Keynes himself had become advocates of bilateralism in the 1930s because of the severity of the slump, but once the opportunity presented itself for a reconstruction of international economic order along liberal lines even if under American leadership, Keynes had no hesitation in recommending what the choice should be for Britain. As he told the House of Lords:
To suppose that a system of bilateral and barter arrangements is the best way of encouraging the Dominions to centre their trade on London, seems to me pretty near frenzy. As a technique of little Englandism, adopted as a last resort when all else has failed us, with this small country driven to autarchy, keeping to itself in a harsh and unfriendly world, it might make more sense. But those who talk this way, in the expectation that the rest of the Commonwealth will throw in their lot on these lines and cut their free commercial relations with the rest of the world, can have very little idea of how this Empire has grown or by what means it can be sustained. 20
After 1945 there was a close collaboration between Britain and the United States in rebuilding an international economic and political order, but there were important differences between the two powers. As the emergent hegemon, the United States pressed for as full and complete a liberalisation of international economic relations as possible. As the former hegemon, Britain favoured a period of transition in which it would only gradually relinquish its sphere of influence and would still be able to retain control over large parts of its colonial empire. But Britain supported the United States' aim of recreating an open multilateral trading economy, seeing the advantages of re-establishing sterling as an international currency and rebuilding the financial and insurance services of the City, as well as Britain's overseas investment portfolio.
The early move to achieve convertibility and multilateralism had failed by 1947, and the United States instead launched Marshall Aid to help rebuild the shattered European economies and prevent any more being absorbed into the Soviet sphere of influence. The objectives of Bretton Woods were eventually achieved, but much later, in the 1960s. Britain sought close partnership with the United States in both the military and the economic sphere. But the partnership was always an unequal one and became more unequal as time went on, partly because Britain seemed to retain many of the disadvantages of being a hegemon without any longer enjoying the advantages. The burden of overseas military spending and an overvalued currency contributed to the neglect of long-term investment in domestic industry. British economy and society were not reorganised successfully to allow Britain to compete effectively within the new expanding world economy. Hegemony was transferred, international economic order was rebuilt, but in the first four decades after the end of the war, Britain was one of the casualties rather than one of the beneficiaries.
Reading the voluminous literature on British industrial decline, a visitor to Britain in the 1970s or 1980s might have expected to find a country in economic collapse, with large absolute falls in living standards. But although particular groups and sectors have experienced absolute declines, the general experience is not one of absolute decline at all. On the contrary the economy has made steady progress throughout the century, and will produce three to four times as much wealth in 2000 as it did in 1900.
If there has been any economic decline at all, it has been a relative decline, a decline that can only be observed when the performance of the British economy is compared with the performance of similar economies. Whether it makes sense to compare the performance of national economies as though they were single organisations with a directing will has often been questioned. But it has become a staple part of political debate. The relative decline of the British economy has been a constant theme in political debate in Britain since the 1880s, and at certain times, particularly in the early 1960s and 1970s, has been a central and obsessive theme. Even if it were concluded that decline was an illusion lacking any objective basis in reality it would still be necessary to explain why such a large part of Britain's political elite interpreted British experience in the twentieth century as one of decline.
The argument of this chapter is that this question can be answered once it is understood that the question of decline only makes sense by considering the interrelationship of the relative economic decline and the absolute decline in world power. It was always the absolute decline that mattered most to the British political elite, and measures to stave that off and preserve Britain's traditional global role always took preference over the task of modernising the British economy and British society. The way which the British found to preserve their global role long after the economic and military conditions for their hegemony had been eroded was the preservation of the empire. But ultimately Britain was obliged to choose between its empire and the reconstruction of an international economic order, which Britain could no longer hope to dominate. Britain chose the latter, but was always divided by it, and remained encumbered by its traditional aspirations. Until the 1980s the British political elite failed to draw the radical implications of the choice it made in the 1940s.
In terms of its importance and capacities as a great power, Britain's position in 2000 will be much reduced compared to 1900. The historical puzzle is not so much why it happened, but why it was relatively so smooth, and to what extent the smoothness of the process contributed to the difficulties Britain found in maintaining economic competitiveness. There is a rich vein of academic writing on decline, which has explored this idea. Stephen Blank argued that Britain's post-war decline was due to the choice of an inappropriate foreign economic policy, which gave priority to the protection of Britain's traditional global role--foreign investment, overseas military bases, and a high exchange rate for sterling-at the expense of industrial investment and economic modernisation. 21 What such approaches suggest is that the phenomenon of decline in a state which is or has been hegemonic has its own special character. An imperial state whose elite has become accustomed to thinking in global terms views poor domestic economic performance, its causes and its remedies, in a particular way. The political debate on British decline lasted from the 1880s to the 1980s, but the context of hegemony and empire, which gave it significance, is now no more. Decline is unlikely to haunt the British political imagination in the twenty-first century as it did in the twentieth.
1. Parker, G. (1985), Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century.
2. Van der Pijl, K. (1984), The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class, London, p. 53.
3. See for example Wiener, M. (1981). English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980.
4. There is a long literature stemming from Alexander Gorschenkron's analysis (1962) of the politics of economic development; Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge.
5. Trotsky, L (1974), Collected Writings and Speeches on Britain, London, New Park
6. Wallerstein, I. (1974), The Modern World System. New York, p. 347.
7. See especially the work of Cox, R. Production, Power, and World Order, and Approaches to World Order. Cambridge.
8. Kennedy, P. (1988). The Rise and Fail of the Great Powers. London.
9. Kindleberger, C. (1973), The World in Depression, 1929-1939. Berkeley; see also Gilpin R. (1987), The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, New Jersey.
10. Semmel, B. (1970), The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism. Cambridge.
11. Kennedy. P. (1983), Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945, London.
12. Gamble, A. (1994), Britain in Decline: Economic Policy, Political Strategy, and the British State, London, pp. 12, 26.
13. Mackinder, H. (1902), Britain and the British Seas, London, p. 343.
14. Semmnel, The Rise of Free-Trade Imperialism, p. 8.
15. Gardner, R.N. (1956), Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, Oxford, p. 27.
16 Lord Milner, speech at Huddersfield, February 17th, 1910.
17. Watt, D.C. (1975), Personalities and Policies, London, p. 27.
18. Gardner, R. N., Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 19.
19. Van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class.
20. Gardner, R.N., Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 125.
21. Blank, S. (1977), 'The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy', International Organisation, 31 (4), pp. 673-722.