Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Address at Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), "The Transatlantic Partnership:  A History of Defending Freedom; A Future for Extending It," Old Dominion University Symposium, Norfolk, Virginia, October 30, 1998

The Transatlantic Partnership:  A History of Defending Freedom; A Future for Extending It

Admiral Gehman, Dr. Koch, distinguished members of the diplomatic
community and of the armed forces: Thank you for asking me to join you
today as you begin your symposium. You could not have selected a more
vital or current topic than NATO's role in the new millennium.   As we
approach the ninth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall and the
50th anniversary of NATO, we can look back with pride and deep
gratitude at what the Atlantic Alliance has achieved for our people: 50
years of peace, freedom and growing prosperity and a peaceful
revolution in the East that has extended that same promise to millions
more.  Our success has rested on partnership -- a partnership reaching
across the Atlantic; a partnership between diplomacy, economic strength
and military force; and now, finally, a partnership between East and
West.  Men and women in uniform, legislators, diplomats, and citizens
on both sides of the divide worked together.  It took all of us working
together to tear down that wall, and it will take all of us working
together to build a new Europe that is everywhere free, prosperous, and

During the last 9 years we have adapted our security, political, and
economic architecture to the new situation; we must now focus on the
next 50 years.  In Berlin last May, President Clinton invited our
European partners to join us in defining a vision for the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership for the 21st century.  The purpose of this partnership is
simple and enduring:  to protect the security, prosperity, and
democratic moorings of its members.  To do this, we want a Europe that
can act as a partner -- in Europe, across the Atlantic, and around the

Today, and at the NATO summit next April, the focus is on security, the
strong skeleton of the transatlantic structure.  However, the security
aspect of our relationship does not stand alone; it provides the
backbone for and enables the articulation of the political and economic
dimensions.   When the U.S. and Europe act together, we can set the
agenda for global prosperity.  When we do not, we risk stalemate and
uncertainty.  The European Union is clearly the economic partner we
must have for the next century -- and it is much more.  The EU also can
be our partner for dealing with global problems of crime and the
environment and with regional and humanitarian crises.  We have
accomplished a great deal using what we call the New Transatlantic
Agenda, and a deeper partnership with the EU can help us meet each of
the three challenges facing us -- peaceful and democratic integration
within Europe, strengthened ties between Europe and America to advance
the prosperity of our peoples, and joint action beyond Europe in the
wider world to meet global and regional challenges.  Those goals are
threatened today.

Kosovo Challenges That Vision

In place of a grand struggle between freedom and tyranny, in which
nuclear devastation threatened, we now find ourselves struggling with
regional and ethnic conflicts  where fear takes its form not in nuclear
annihilation but in genocide, torched villages, hunger, hatred, and
wrecked economies.  In the very heart of Europe, most recently in
Kosovo, we have witnessed atrocities that seem to belong to another,
more brutal era.  Kosovo, like Bosnia before it, poses a humanitarian
and security problem for the transatlantic community that threatens the
integration of Europe and our efforts in Bosnia.  If not resolved, it
could spill beyond its borders, inflame the region, and, in a worst-
case scenario, put two NATO allies on opposite sides of the equation.
We have both the interest and the obligation to stop the killing.  The
consequences of a failure to act are such that NATO and its members
have taken the rarely resorted-to step of threatening to use force if
unacceptable use of force on the other side is not stopped and the
world community's objectives are not complied with.

We have a strategy.  Our goals are to end the violence, prevent a
humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe, and compel Milosevic
to negotiate with Kosovars on real autonomy.  It is a situation in
which military force backs diplomatic and humanitarian efforts.  Dick
Holbrooke and, later, General Clark and most recently General Naumann
have traveled to Belgrade to make sure Milosevic understood NATO's
message loud and clear.  Meanwhile, Ambassador Hill is shuttling
between Pristina and Belgrade to negotiate a political agreement for
the future, in a coordinated U.S.-European approach.  Milosevic has
agreed to accept 2,000 OSCE monitors.   This mission will be
coordinated with NATO, which is establishing an air verification
mission (AVM) and reaction force so that observers can be extracted in
the event of an emergency.   We also have designated a senior U.S.
official to work with the Kosovo Liberation Army, are providing $59
million and 47,000 metric tons of food to aid agencies in Kosovo, and
are increasing support for independent media in Serbia following
Milosevic's recent, unacceptable crackdown.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203 identify a number of key
areas in which Belgrade -- which means President Milosevic -- must take
action.  These include   pulling back security forces engaged in
repression in Kosovo, allowing full and unfettered access to
humanitarian workers and international observers, creating conditions
conducive to the return of refugees and displaced persons, and
cooperating with the international criminal tribunal and in political

Milosevic's performance to date is mixed.  There has been positive
movement -- the cease-fire has generally held, the humanitarian
situation is improving, and a substantial number of units have been
returned to garrison -- but Belgrade still falls short of full
compliance.  While NATO decided on October 27 not to execute air
strikes, the threat of air strikes remains ready and in place at the
call of the North Atlantic Council to ensure continued progress toward
full, sustained compliance.

Diplomacy Backed by a Credible Use of Force

In 1961, the Allies faced a different challenge in central Europe --
the Berlin crisis.  In an address to the nation at that time, President
Kennedy said that "we will at all times be ready to talk, if talk will
help.  But we must also be ready to resist with force . . . . Either
alone would fail.  Together they can serve the cause of freedom and
peace."  To back up his threat, President Kennedy then and there
announced a build-up of military force.  That credible threat of force
made the actual use of it unnecessary by ensuring the success of our

Diplomacy backed by force has been a large factor in U.S. leadership in
this century.  We have used diplomacy as the first tool because we
value life -- the lives of our own and of our allies but also of our
opponents.  Diplomacy is our first line of defense -- and offense --
yet there is no question that force is indispensable to effective
diplomacy.  As Chinese strategist Sun Tzu put it, "If you are prepared
to use force you may subdue the enemy without fighting."

In the vast majority of situations, U.S. diplomacy works without even
the need to threaten force.  The readiness of our armed forces has sent
a clear message that gives quiet power to U.S. diplomacy and to our
efforts to build a free and peaceful world.  However, there are times
when we have had to use force or threaten it in order to achieve our
objectives.   The Berlin crisis is just one example in which a credible
threat was needed in order to achieve a peaceful solution.

In the Balkans, we have seen repeatedly that violence does not end
until the perpetrators understand we are serious about using force.  In
Bosnia, it took our airplanes and bombs to get the Serbs to the
negotiating table.  In Kosovo,  Milosevic had doubted our resolve, but
NATO's approval of the ACTORDs administered a hard dose of reality.
Subsequent action in the UN Security Council has left him with no
doubt:  We have the force, we have the will, and we have the consensus
of the international community.

Ironically, the welcome end of the Cold War and its attendant
bipolarity also means that people such as Milosevic and Saddam Hussein
feel that constraints on aggression are lower.  Instead of joining the
ever-growing community of responsible countries, they taunt it.  They
break the norms of acceptable behavior, use force, and then dare the
rest of us to stop them.  The silent fact of our power has proven to be
insufficient; only its use or a credible threat of its use has stopped
them.   Saddam and Milosevic have made the classic miscalculation of
autocrats facing democracies, a miscalculation as old and as mistaken
as that of the Spartans facing the Athenians.  They assumed democracies
cannot agree among themselves and that we have no stomach for battle.
Milosevic and Saddam both have lost their bets before, and yet both
continue to gamble.

This poses a problem for all of us because it means that in order to
pursue our interests, we have had to ratchet up more quickly from
diplomacy as a first tool to diplomacy backed by a credible threat of
force.   And the threat of force cannot be credible if there is no
intention to actually use it to achieve key objectives should diplomacy
fail.  We and our Allies also have had to confront new issues
surrounding the use of force.  Recently, the need to use force has
stemmed from human rights and humanitarian concerns or the need to
contain a conflict.  These principles have had to be reconciled with
various aspects of international law, such as the inviolability of
borders.   Kosovo was as difficult a case as there can be, but we and
our Allies have built a strong consensus in NATO and are doing together
what needs to be done.

As a nation and as an alliance, we must continue to use the tools at
our disposal:  diplomacy first, the credible threat of force to back
our diplomacy, and the use of force when necessary.   At times, Saddam
and Milosevic have seemed under the illusion that they had their finger
on the world's trigger.  Let me be clear:  We do not consign to anyone
the prestige of our nation or the Alliance, the lives of our men and
women, or our hopes for a peaceful, open world community.  If we have
to use force, it will be at a time and place of our choosing.

Prospects for the Transatlantic Community

Now let me turn to prospects for the transatlantic community.  In the
last 9 years, the transatlantic community has worked hard to build a
Europe whole and free -- a dream shared by the vast majority of
countries and one we will not allow outlaws to derail or defer.
Security is fundamental to this goal and begins with strong, capable
forces.  But there are other elements of security, as well -- from
modifying force structure to encompass new threats, to pursuing arms
control, to building political and economic ties that lead nations to
regard each other as friends and not foes.  We are pushing the
boundaries in all these areas, with our eye on the 21st century.  Let's
review progress:

Institutions and force structure have evolved, even as the core
mission of NATO -- collective defense -- remains constant;

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are engaged in joining the
Atlantic Alliance;
We have established a credible open door policy with a clear
perspective for other countries that aspire to eventual membership.
Secretary General Solana is well-positioned to build consensus on next
steps, which we believe should include more active Alliance measures to
strengthen our ability to work with all partners and to help make
aspirants the best possible candidates they can be;
Central Europe has been put on a path of integration and stability. We
have joined with partners across the continent in NATO's Partnership
for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and in the OSCE's
conflict prevention and democracy endeavors;
We have stepped up our engagement in both northeastern and
southeastern Europe;
We have built a new, cooperative relationship with Russia, in the
Permanent Joint Council, the Partnership for Peace, and through
military partnership in Bosnia to name a few -- a relationship that
many critics claimed would be impossible alongside NATO enlargement --
and we are building a distinctive relationship with Ukraine; and
We have begun to address in new ways the growing problem of weapons
proliferation, while building on existing arms control treaties and
weapons conventions.

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Arms Control

A weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on any major European or
North American capital from a rogue state or terrorist group is a
threat that NATO must be able to confront.  Stopping the spread of
missiles capable of carrying WMD is one of our most immediate and
critical security challenges.  This is exemplified by Iran's test of
the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, capable of delivering WMD
throughout the Middle East and beyond and North Korea's test of the
1,500 kilometer-plus range Taepo Dong 1 missile.  Several other
countries including Iraq and Libya also have continued to pursue
indigenous missile development programs.  All of these programs
actively seek foreign technology on a worldwide basis.

At the NATO summit, we plan to draw more attention to this increasing
threat.  We believe NATO should develop a common assessment of the
threat and accelerate development of capabilities to counter it, to
complement the support NATO countries simultaneously give to
multilateral non-proliferation regimes such as the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), which includes all NATO members and which puts
constraints on outside help to develop missiles capable of WMD delivery
and on their related equipment and technology.

Other important non-proliferation regimes include the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), which we are committed to strengthening by increasing
the number of countries that have ratified it and by seeking full
implementation of the concrete measures in the CWC that raise the costs
and risks for any parties who engage in chemical weapons activities.  I
have told the Foreign Minister of Sudan that his country should adhere
to the convention if it wants to rejoin the community of responsible

The U.S. continues to play a leading role in the effort to reduce the
threat from biological weapons.  In his 1998 State of the Union
address, President Clinton announced an initiative to finish the
compliance and transparency protocol of the Biological Weapons

Arms control is also a central piece of our security strategy. The
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe -- the CFE Treaty -- has
enjoyed unparalleled success.  To date, more than 50,000 pieces of
combat equipment have been eliminated, and the Treaty's detailed data
requirements and intrusive verification provisions ensure unprecedented
transparency and predictability.  It is a cornerstone of European
military stability, which we are now adapting to the evolving political
climate in Europe. NATO has set the stage for signing an adapted CFE
Treaty at the 1999 OSCE summit.

NATO Summit

Next April, we have the privilege of holding in Washington the 50th
anniversary summit of the North Atlantic Alliance.  We hope to make
progress on all these elements, from security architecture to arms
control and from the open door for our partners to the closed door to
proliferators.  Here's our goal for the NATO summit: We want to create
the NATO of the 21st century -- a larger, more flexible Alliance
committed to collective defense and capable of dealing with a broad
range of challenges to Alliance interests.

Collective defense is and will be the cornerstone of the Alliance.  We
must never forget that or allow anything to happen which would
jeopardize our ability to carry out this irreducible commitment to face
shared risks and to shoulder shared responsibilities.  That is what
NATO was -- and still is -- all about.

But if NATO is to remain effective in the 21st century, it too must
continue to change, modernize, and adapt to new circumstances.  When we
talk about new threats to NATO countries, weapons proliferation is
certainly one.  Regional conflict is another.  If you ask where U.S.
and European forces could face conflict in the decade ahead, the answer
must include scenarios beyond NATO's near borders.  Moving NATO to
think about how to deal with these issues is very much in the U.S.
interest.  It should be a new direction for the Alliance's focus.

During the Cold War, it made sense for Europeans to concentrate on the
threat to their own territory and for the U.S. to assume the primary
responsibility for defending common transatlantic interests elsewhere.
But such an arrangement makes less sense at a time when the direct
territorial threat to Europe has diminished and when new threats to our
common interests may come from beyond NATO's immediate borders.  Our
ability to be effective depends increasingly on our ability to work
together with allies and partners. This is one reason why we support
Europe's efforts to project power and deal with a fuller spectrum of
possible future dangers.  I want to affirm our full support also for
building a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO along the
lines agreed by the Alliance in Berlin 2 years ago.

I know that some have suggested we are altering the original intent of
the Washington Treaty or creating some kind of new "global NATO."  This
is, to use a very diplomatic American expression, hogwash.  What we are
talking about is applying the same core principles upon which NATO was
founded to the new realities of the post-Cold War era and to the new
threats to our common transatlantic security.  It clearly makes no
sense that threats to the integrity and cohesion of the Alliance should
not be dealt with where they arise; the notion that we must wait until
they spread to our immediate area of interest belies logic and the
value of preventative diplomacy.

As President Clinton said in Berlin, "Yesterday's NATO guarded our
borders against direct military invasion.  Tomorrow's NATO must
continue to defend enlarged borders and defend against threats to our
security from beyond them -- the spread of weapons of mass destruction,
ethnic violence, and regional conflict."

In addition to grappling with the question of new threats from beyond
our borders and from the hands of weapons proliferators and terrorists,
the summit needs to look at the type of forces necessary in the 21st
century.  A failure to do so would leave us making the bitter mistake
of fighting the last war.  The coalition operations likely in the next
century will require mobile, flexible, and interoperable forces.  For
that reason, NATO needs to harness new technologies that can give us
mobility without driving up costs.

The summit also will mark the entry of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic and sustain the momentum of the enlargement process.  The
extension of enhanced security and stability to all partners regardless
of membership aspirations will depend on NATO's capacity to deepen the
political and military links between Allies and partners.   The summit
should launch intensified political consultation through the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council  even as we also seek to deepen the
partnerships with Ukraine and Russia.   We welcome all partners to join
us in April.  An active, constructive NATO-Russia partnership is
essential to stability throughout Europe.   We will continue to develop
the Permanent Joint Council and seek more transparency on core issues
and practical cooperation, such as through a NATO-Russia Civil
Emergency Training Center.


We are a lucky generation to have witnessed the peaceful evolution of
Europe and to have played roles in that change.  We were raised,
educated, and employed to prevent an East-West conflict and to win if
war broke out.  I daresay none of us imagined that the threat would
simply vanish thanks to the Solidarity Movement in Poland; the Velvet
Revolution in the former Czechoslovakia; Germany's reunification within
NATO; the impact of economic decline, perestroika, and glasnost in
Russia; and the efforts of citizens across the continent.   These
changes brought hope to millions and left us with new job descriptions:
Instead of containing a threat, our jobs now include expanding the area
of peace, freedom, and open societies.

No one appreciates the transatlantic partnership more than those of you
gathered here today.  In the trenches of World War I and on Normandy
Beach, North Americans and Europeans fought side by side.  Through
NATO, the EU, and the Marshall Plan, through decades of cultural,
commercial and educational cooperation, we constructed and defended a
community of free nations.  But 50 years ago -- even 10 years ago --
the greatest threat to that community came from other European
countries -- countries with weapons of mass destruction which
threatened to end the existence of each of our countries.  That era is
over.  As the 21st century approaches, we are building a larger
community.  North Americans, Western Europeans, Central Europeans, and
Eastern Europeans labor together as soldiers, legislators, diplomats,
business people, artists, and humanitarian workers.  Our challenge is
to complete a Europe, free, prosperous, and democratic.  The
partnership between diplomacy and military force remains essential to
the project, and I look forward with hope and enthusiasm to another
century in which we can each work together for our country and side by
side with our allies for the cause of peace and freedom.

[End of Document]

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